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The Coast Guard has begun an initiative to deploy a nationwide Differential Global
Positioning System (DGPS) to support Coast Guard missions and to enhance maritime safety
in harbor navigation. DGPS service is expected to provide accuracy to within ten meters (95%
of the time) to suitably equipped vessels. It would do this by broadcasting corrections to GPS
navigation satellite signals, thereby improving accuracy by a factor of ten over standard GPS.
The primary emphasis of this thesis is to show how decision making and planning for
the DGPS project may be aided by comparing technological alternatives using Cost
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). This method is essentially a means of quantifying effectiveness
per dollar of cost. The author consolidates the discussion of key issues within one document,
identifies the technical decision criteria, estimates alternative system life-cycle costs, and
makes a preliminary finding as to the merits of radiobeacon transmission over a dedicated
satellite channel. In order to quantify effectiveness, many performance criteria are
consolidated under five "figures of merit": accuracy, availability, coverage, integrity, and
adaptability. The inclusion of user equipment prices in life-cycle costs proves to be critical to
the preliminary finding in favor of the radiobeacon-based alternative. This CEA model is
especially suited to decision making in an environment of technological and policy change,
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The basic objective of any engineering design effort is to develop a system
that will perform its intended function in the most cost-effective manner. This
requires recognition of many engineering and management considerations when
making decisions. An important tenet of systems engineering is that it is not
sufficient to design efficient subsystems and put them together. Rather, the effort
seeks to optimize the performance of the system as a whole. All elements of the
system should be addressed on an integrated basis, with trade-offs quantified to
optimize system design. [Ref. l:p. 137]
Decision making for the proposed Coast Guard Differential Global Positioning
System (DGPS) will require just this sort of engineering and managerial analysis.
The research questions for this thesis were:
• How should systems engineering and economic methodologies be applied to
the proposed Coast Guard DGPS project?
• What are the decision/selection criteria?
• For the alternatives considered, which does the author's Cost-Effectiveness
Analysis (CEA) indicate is best?
The research approach to answer these questions consisted of:
• Surveying available literature from various disciplines relevant to this DGPS
project, including: navigation, electronics, telecommunications, economics,
systems engineering and management.
• Identifying Coast Guard objectives and DGPS issues, with consideration of
existing and proposed technology.
• Applying CEA so as to explore the suitability of the method and decision
criteria to the project in general.
• Identifying a preferred alternative based upon the author's weighting of the
decision criteria.
B. SCOPE
The thrust of this thesis is to show how decision making may be facilitated by
using CEA to compare technological alternatives. This method is essentially a
means of quantifying effectiveness per dollar of cost. Two broadcast alternatives (a
radiobeacon broadcast and a dedicated satellite channel broadcast) are analyzed to
illustrate the procedure.
The primary purpose is not the recommendation of a definitive DGPS service
design. A definitive solution would require the analysis of a pool of alternatives
too large to do justice to here. Also, the CEA results are based upon the author's
necessarily subjective weighing and rating of the two systems' performance
parameters. Although the conclusions of this thesis indicate that the radiobeacon
alternative seems preferable to the satellite alternative, an operational decision
should also incorporate the input of experienced individuals with other
perspectives. Furthermore, the context of the problem is still developing, and a
final decision on the "best" DGPS configuration would be inappropriate at this
early stage.
Instead of supplying an immediate answer, the CEA model may aid the
evolution of a DGPS service design by facilitating iterative systems engineering to
gradually produce an optimal solution. Systems engineering is a process for
system development: it begins when a need becomes apparent and continues
through deployment of a suitable system in the field. As the project progresses
through its life cycle, engineering decisions will be made that could have a
significant feedback effect on what has already been accomplished. The model will
encourage consideration of changes or new information to reevaluate the design.
The structure for analyzing the effectiveness of a DGPS system is proposed in
Chapter V.B., Tables 5-1 and 5-2. This model is a simplified representation of the
real world which is adapted to abstract the features of the problem being analyzed.
The model, in itself, is not the decision maker, but a tool that presents the
necessary data in support of the decision-making process [Ref. l:pp. 11-43]. It
incorporates the following criteria:
• Accuracy: update rate, latency, reference station spacing
• Availability: component dependability, resistance to EMI, resistance to
ionospheric variations, resistance to multipath and signal obstruction,
graceful degradation
• Coverage: harbor and harbor approaches and coastal phase, ocean phase,
inland phase
• Integrity: timeliness, index of safety
• Adaptability: international compatibility, interagency compatibility, technical
flexibility, open systems interoperability, spectral efficiency, institutional
impact.
Logistics and procurement strategy are not considered in detail. Project
planning and several issues surrounding DGPS network design are discussed, but
no detailed planning proposals are developed.
C. RELEVANCE OF DGPS TO THE COAST GUARD
1. Historical Precedent
Coast Guard involvement in providing navigation services originated
with the incorporation of the Lighthouse Service in 1939. The Lighthouse Service
had a major role in developing radio-equipped airways. The Coast Guard
integrated the Lighthouse engineers with its Office of Engineering, and so acquired
a great deal of technological experience in the emerging field of electronics. In
1946, when the Navy needed a coordinator for the troubled project that was to
become Loran, it called on the Coast Guard. From this beginning, the Coast Guard
has grown to become the Federal provider of long range, terrestrially-based
radionavigation systems. [Ref. l:pp. 96-98]
2. Existing Responsibility
The Coast Guard has the responsibility to provide for safe and efficient
navigation as follows:
In order to aid navigation and to prevent disasters, collisions, and wrecks of
vessels and aircraft, the Coast Guard may establish, maintain, and operate...
electronic aids to navigation systems (a) required to serve the needs of the
armed forces of the United States... or (b) required to serve the needs of the
maritime commerce of the United States; or (c) required to serve the needs of
the air commerce of the United States as requested by the Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration. [Ref. 2]
Under the provisions of this law, the Coast Guard now operates the radiobeacon,
Loran-C, and Omega long range radionavigation systems.
Additionally, the Coast Guard already has been appointed by the
Department of Transportation (DOT) as lead agency for the GPS civil user
interface. This includes Coast Guard coordination of the Civil GPS Interface
Committee, a forum for the exchange of information and views on GPS matters.
The Coast Guard is also responsible for disseminating Department of Defense
(DOD) originated GPS information through the operation of the GPS Information
Center.
3. Growing Need for DGPS
At the least, DGPS-level accuracy is needed for the Coast Guard's own
use to most efficiently perform Coast Guard missions. Most prominent are the
needs for the positioning of buoys and the positioning of ships participating in
Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) [Ref. 3:p. 2]. Also, DGPS has the potential to be used
by the general public for radionavigation in restricted waters, particularly if it is
integrated with real-time display on electronic charts [Ref. 4:p. 306,318]. This
could allow higher levels of vessel safety or economic efficiency in harbors,
especially in darkness or unfamiliar ports (see Chapter III).
Historically, radionavigation initiatives have been accelerated by
focused public interest in oil spill prevention. A major impetus for speedy
completion of the Coast Guard Loran-C system was anticipation of increased
tanker traffic from the Trans-Alaska pipeline [Ref. 5:p. 142]. In response to recent
oil spills, the demand for improved accident-prevention measures has grown once
again. The rationale is well stated by William J. Cook in an essay in U.S. News
and World Report:
... Exxon Valdez was out of range of the Coast Guard's simple radar system
when the accident happened. And most U.S. oil ports, unlike airports, don't
even have radar. The Coast Guard, in fact, shut down its New York harbor
radar two years ago for lack of money. Following the Exxon Valdez and Mega
Borg accidents, we'll probably end up with an expensive technofix-millions of
dollars' worth of equipment and chemicals pre-positioned near places where
oil spills might occur. We might get better results for less money if we
emulated aviation and invested more in improved tanker design and
maintenance, crew training and accident-prevention procedures. What sense
does it make for a nation to spend a fortune sending the Navy to the Persian
Gulf to keep oil moving when it spends so little to keep tankers steaming
safely? [Ref. 6:p. 15]
Since the publishing of this essay, the Oil Spill Pollution Act of 1990 was signed
into law; it included provisions for improvement of VTS Prince William Sound (site
of the Exxon Valdez spill), to include DGPS components.
4. Coast Guard Distinctive Competence
The Coast Guard is well situated to meet the forecasted need for a
nationwide DGPS system. It has the necessary "distinctive competence", a term
used by Bragaw in Managing a Federal Agency:
First, the Coast Guard identifies national needs in its area. These needs are
the demands of the various publics to be served—its constituents.... Second,
the Coast Guard identifies the means—its distinctive competence-that ideally
equip it to fill these needs. These means are the type and number of its
human and physical resources-the very "character" of the organization. [Ref.
5:p. 42]
Providing DGPS service would advance Coast Guard organizational
expertise in support of the strategic goal of continuing to serve the nation's public
long range navigation needs into the next century. The Coast Guard can build on
the experiences of its other radionavigation systems, which provide the
organizational "distinctive competence" to provide DGPS service. In addition, over
ten years of research, development, testing and evaluation of DGPS have been
done by the Coast Guard R&D Center [Ref. 3:p. 2]. In summary:
The structure should seek to take on those programs and services that the
Coast Guard can carry out more effectively than anyone else. The distinctive
competence and credibility of the Coast Guard should be important factors in
developing proactive and innovative public policy and programs. [Ref. 5: pp.
36-37]
D. CHAPTER OUTLINE
A technical background necessary for a basic understanding of DGPS issues
is provided in Chapter II. This includes discussions of radionavigation in general,
GPS, DGPS, and system architecture.
The remainder of this study directly follows the CEA methodology. The
essential steps of CEA analysis adapted for DGPS implementation planning, and
the chapters they are addressed in, are as follows:
• define system objectives (Chapter III)
• state evaluation assumptions (Chapter III)
• identify essential mission requirements (Chapter IV)
• list alternatives (Chapter IV)
• establish effectiveness measures (Chapter V)
• evaluate alternatives' overall effectiveness (Chapter V)
• develop cost data (Chapter V)
• assess effectiveness and cost risks (Chapter VI)
• perform cost-effectiveness computations (Chapter VI)




Radio signals have been used for decades to provide directional homing
and navigational lines of position. The basic purpose of "navigation" is guiding the
safe movement of a vehicle from one place to another. 'Positioning", on the other
hand, is the process of determining, at a particular point in time, the precise
location of a vehicle or site. The subtle but significant difference hinges upon the
greater safety burden on navigation. International agreements governing use of
the radio frequency spectrum include allocations for "radionavigation" and
"radiolocation" services. The following terms should be understood in the sense
used by the Radio Regulations of the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
[Ref. 7:pp. 1-3, 1-7]:
• Radiodetermination: The determination of the position, velocity and/or other
characteristics of an object, or the obtaining of information relating to these
parameters, by means of the propagation properties of radio waves; includes
navigation and positioning.
• Radionavigation: Radiodetermination used for the purposes of navigation,
including obstruction warning.
• Radiolocation: Radiodetermination used for purposes other than those of
radionavigation.
• Radiodetermination Satellite Service (RDSS): a radiocommunication service
involving the use of radiodetermination and the use of one or more space
stations [Ref. 8:p. 63].
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In the United States the Federal government has long provided
navigation services to the general public. The Department of Transportation is
responsible for civil navigation. In addition, the Department of Defense provides
navigation services to the military, some of which are used by the civilian
community. There are also a number of privately developed and operated
radiolocation systems. They operate in the radiolocation frequency bands using a
variety of techniques; they are used where public radiodetermination coverage is
not available or sufficiently accurate. [Ref. 7:pp. 1-3, 1-7]
2. Radionavigation System Parameters
Description and comparison of the various radionavigation systems is
facilitated by the use of standard parameters. The interested reader may refer to
Appendix A of the Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) for a complete description
of the ten prescribed parameters. However, three of these (accuracy, availability,
and integrity) are used extensively in the following chapters and should be
understood in the sense of the definitions contained in the FRP, as follows:
a. Accuracy
As used in navigation, accuracy is the degree of conformance of a
measured position to the true position of the craft at that time. Accuracy is a
statistical measure of performance, and is meaningless unless it includes a
statement of the uncertainty in position which applies. Two-dimensional
horizontal accuracies in this paper are normally "2drms": 95% of positions provided
by the navigation system will be within the given distance of the true location.
Also, accuracy must be related to one, two, or three dimensions
[Ref. 9:p. A-l]:
• When specifying one-dimensional linear accuracy (altitude, for example), the
95 percent confidence level is equivalent to "2 sigma". Alternatives used in
various references are "1 sigma" (68%) or "Linear Error Probable" (LEP:
50%). [Ref. 10:p. 3-5]
• When two-dimensional (e.g., horizontal) accuracies are cited in this study, the
"2drms" (distance root mean square) uncertainty estimate will be used.
Depending on the assumptions used, this statistical measure can vary
between 98 and 95 percent. As used herein, "2drms" accuracy will be at 95
percent. Alternative measures include: "2 sigma" (86%), "1 sigma" (39%), and
"Circular Error Probable" (CEP: 50%). CEP may be roughly converted to
2drms by multiplying by 2.5 [Ref. 9: p. A-2J.
• When three dimensions are relevant, the linear accuracy in the vertical axis
is often considered separately from the two dimensional horizontal accuracy.
Alternatively, some references assume equal variation in all dimensions and
use Spherical Error Probable (SEP: 50%) or one, two, or three sigma (about
20%, 79%, and 97%, respectively). [Ref. 10:p. 3-5]
b. Availability
Signal availability is the percentage of time that navigational
signals transmitted from external sources are available at the user's antenna. It is
a function of both the physical environment and the transmitter facilities. [Ref.
9:p. A-2]
c. Integrity
As used in radionavigation literature, integrity is the ability of a
system to provide timely warnings to users when the system should not be used for
navigation [Ref. 9:p. A-3]. A marine navigator must know promptly when a system
should no longer be relied upon. This allows a shift to an alternate navigation aid,
or may dictate that the vessel be put at anchor until service is restored. Without
integrity mechanisms, a temporarily inaccurate system may lead the trusting
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navigator to hazard the vessel. A strong, timely integrity mechanism is a primary
requirement of a safe public radionavigation service that is usually not critical to a
commercial radiolocation system, which is intended for positioning.
3. Marine Phases of Navigation
Marine navigation can take place in four areas, or "major phases", as
defined by the FRP. The various radionavigation requirements associated with
each phase will be delineated in Chapter IV. While some public radionavigation
systems can be used in more than one phase of marine navigation, no current
system meets the requirements for all. [Ref. 9:pp. 2-3, 2-22, 3-6]
a. Coastal Phase
This phase encompasses waters within 50 nautical miles (nm) from
shore or within the limit of the Continental Shelf (200 meters in depth), whichever
is greater. For an area to be included, there must be a safe path of water at least
one mile wide, if a one-way path, or two miles wide, if a two-way path. More
restrictive waters are assumed to be in the Harbor/Harbor Approach Phase. The
Coastal Phase includes the open waters of the Great Lakes, and any waters where
traffic separation schemes have been established, and where requirements for the
accuracy of navigation are thereby made more rigid than those of ocean navigation.
[Ref. 9:pp. 2-31
b. Ocean Phase
This phase is best described as seaward of the coastal phase just
defined. The hazards of shallow water and of collision are comparatively small
[Ref. 9:pp. 2-4]
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c. Harbor/Harbor Approach Phase (HHA)
This phase usually begins in waters just inshore of those of the
coastal phase, normally near the restricted waters of an entrance to a bay, river or
harbor. Navigation typically entails transit of a well defined channel which varies
from 600 to 120 meters in width. For a seagoing ship entering from the coastal
phase, the HHA phase ends at the mooring. [Ref. 9:pp. 2-3]
d. Inland Waterways Phase
Navigable channels used by inland traffic are often narrower than
the harbor access channels used by large ships. Restricted visibility, shifting of
channels in unstable waters, and ice present problems to navigation. Typical
traffic includes recreational vessels and tug-barge combinations. [Ref. 9:pp. 2-31
4. Current Public U.S. Radionavigation Systems
There are a number of radionavigation systems currently in operation
which find extensive usage in the civil sector. Each has particular features which
make it attractive for certain users. Loran-C, VOR, VOR/DME, TACAN, Transit,
radiobeacons, and GPS will be briefly described here; the interested reader should
refer to Appendix A of the FRP for further information on these systems, or on
Omega, ILS, or MLS.
a. Loran-C
This low frequency system was developed to provide a military
radionavigation capability with longer range and greater accuracy than its
predecessor, Loran-A. It was subsequently selected as the U.S. government-
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provided radionavigation system for civil maritime use in U.S. coastal areas. It
has also been installed in a number of other areas around the world.
Loran-C is the chief system in use for U.S. coastal maritime
radionavigation. However, in order to satisfy the needs of air navigation, Loran-C
coverage is now being expanded to fill the present mid-continent coverage gap.
The number of land users has increased, largely as part of vehicle
tracking/reporting systems. [Ref. 7:p. 1-4]
Loran-C operates at 100 kHz. A typical chain of stations provides
reliable ground-wave service over an area 1000 miles across. Within the U.S.,
Loran-C is maintained by the U.S. Coast Guard and is available more than 99% of
the time within the stated coverage areas. Accuracy varies with location within
the coverage areas, but absolute accuracy (95%) is specified to be 0.25 nautical mile
(nm), but relative and repeatable accuracy is much better, typically 50 to 200 feet.
[Ref. 7:p. 1-4]
6. VOR, VORIDME, TACAN
These three systems provide basic guidance for enroute air
navigation in the U.S.; since we are primarily concerned with marine applications,
they will only be considered briefly here. Their acronyms have the following
meanings: VHF Omni-directional Range (VOR), Distance Measuring Equipment
(DME), and Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN). VOR provides bearing with respect
to the ground installation, DME provides range, and TACAN provides both
(primarily to military users). Since these are line-of-sight systems, ground
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coverage is quite limited; however, at 20,000 feet their signals can be received to
typically 200 miles. [Ref. 9:pp. A-9 - A-15]
c. Radiobeacon.8
Radiobeacons are nondirectional radio transmitting stations which
operate in the low frequency (LF) and medium frequency (MF) bands to provide
ground wave signals to a receiver. A radio direction finder (RDF) is used to
measure the bearing of the transmitter with respect to the aircraft or vessel.
Radiobeacons are relatively inexpensive to install, operate, and maintain; they are
widely used throughout the world. [Ref. 9:p. A-19 - A-24]
Radiobeacons operate in three bands: aeronautical non-directional
beacons (NDBs), 190-415 and 510-535 kHz.; and maritime radiobeacons, 285-325
kHz. Bearing accuracy is largely dependent on the RDF receiver design and
antenna installation, but typical accuracies are about 3 degrees. While coastal
coverage is not continuous everywhere, it is sufficient to enable a maritime
navigator to obtain frequent lines of position at a low cost. In the U.S., the
aviation radiobeacon network provides enough coverage that an aircraft is usually
within range of at least one NDB. Radiobeacons will be discussed further in
Chapter IV. [Ref. 9:p. A-19 - A-34]
d. Transit
Transit is a space-based radiodetermination system that utilizes
satellites in approximately 600 nm polar orbits. Users can obtain a fix every one-
half to three hours when a single satellite comes into view. Only one satellite is
required to get a fix. Transit is operated by the U.S. Navy for worldwide military
14
use, but there are no barriers to extensive civil use. It is anticipated that
operation will be discontinued during the mid 1990s. [Ref. 9: 3-32, A-36]
Transit satellites are typically visible for about 20 minutes, during
which time a receiver monitors the doppler effects on the satellite's signals to
determine the user's position. For a moving vehicle, accuracy of Transit may be
degraded by an erroneous estimate of own course and speed; a 1.0 knot error may
cause a 0.2 nm fix error [Ref. 9:p. A-34]. With a single satellite pass using a single
frequency receiver, an accuracy of about 500 meters (2drms) is achievable. A dual
frequency receiver can correct for ionospheric effects to achieve an accuracy of 25
meters (2drms). [Ref. 7:p. 1-6]
e. NAVSTAR GPS
The NAVSTAR Global Positioning System (GPS) is a satellite-based
radionavigation system being developed by the U.S. DOD as a military system with
military objectives in mind; it will not be fully available to civilian users. It is a
"coarse/fine" system which uses the coarse portion for acquisition and data, and the
fine portion for high-accuracy military navigation and positioning. Current policy
is to provide the "coarse" Standard Positioning Service (SPS) at a 100 meter
(2drms) accuracy level without restriction to the international civilian user
community. The policy whereby errors are deliberately incorporated in the system
to reduce accuracy to that level is called "Selective Availability" (SA). Military and
other authorized users with the correct codes can use the 18 meter (2drms)
accuracies of the exclusive Precise Positioning System (PPS). Limitations on civil
use are controversial. GPS is described more fully in the next section.
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Differential GPS (DGPS) is an "add-on" to GPS, not a part of the
DOD-provided basic system. It uses fixed, ground-based receivers and transmits
corrections for GPS inaccuracies in the local area. It allows positioning accurate to
under ten meters for all users. DGPS will be discussed in Section C.
The relative accuracies of the some of the ways GPS can be used
are summarized and compared with some other radionavigation systems in Table
2-1 [Ref. 9: App. A, Ref. ll:p. 63]. However, predictable accuracy is only a portion
of the utility of a system. For example, the superior repeatable accuracy of Loran-
C favors that system, while the intermittent availability of Transit detracts from
that satellite system's utility.
TABLE 2-1: PREDICTABLE RADIONAVIGATION ACCURACIES (SIGNAL-
IN-SPACE) [Ref. 9, Ref. ll:p. 63]
METHOD OF POSITIONING POSITIONING ACCURACY(2drms)
Loran-C 460 meters
SPS with Selective Avail. 100 meters
SPS w/o Selective Avail. 40 meters
Transit (Dual Freq.) 25 meters
PPS 18 meters
Differential SPS 10 meters
The U.S. Government has recognized the place of GPS in civilian
applications in the FRP for years. The Coast Guard has been designated the lead
DOT agency for GPS, with responsibility to act as the liaison between civil GPS
users and the government. The Coast Guard provides an interface to civil GPS
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users, administers the PPS to qualified civil users, and coordinates input from the
Civil GPS Service Interface Committee (CGSIC).
B. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM
1. Introduction
The Global Positioning System (GPS) is also referred to as NAVSTAR.
GPS consists of three segments: Space (satellites), Control (facilities for remote
maintenance and operation of the satellites) and User (the receivers). Together,
they are designed to provide continuous, three-dimensional navigational fixes
anywhere in the world.
GPS should not be confused with the older Transit Navy Navigation
Satellite System or with the similar Soviet GLONASS system. GLONASS has
much in common with GPS, but uses a different orbital configuration and a
different method of distinguishing between individual satellite signals (FDMA
instead of CDMA).
2. Space Segment
The complete configuration will consist of 21 fully capable "Block II"
model GPS satellites, and three spares. The DOD is expected to declare the GPS
constellation fully operational when 21 operational Block II satellites are in place
in 1993 [Ref. 9:p. 3-36]. They will be deployed in six circular orbital planes at an
altitude of 20,200 km (10,900 nautical miles); this is three satellites plus one spare
per plane. The orbital planes will be oriented at about 55 degrees from the
equator. This will allow five satellites to be within line-of-sight virtually any time
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and any place. A minimum of four satellites are needed to obtain a full three
dimensional point position fix. [Ref. 9:p. A-31]
GPS satellites broadcast continuously to navigational users on two UHF
frequencies. Each satellite transmits on the same L band frequencies, LI (1575.42
MHz) and L2 (1227.6 MHz); however, each employs unique spectrum spreading
codes to allow simultaneous transmission by all satellites without interference
(code division multiple access). LI carries a precise (P) code and a coarse-
acquisition (C/A, or S) code. L2 carries the P code. The encrypted P-code carries a
finer distance measuring scale, and is protected against "spoofing": hostile military
transmission of incorrect GPS signals. Also, access to this second frequency allows
sophisticated DOD receivers to detect the difference in ionospheric refraction
between the carriers, and calculate a correction. All GPS signals are of the spread
spectrum type using Bi-Phase Shift Keying (BPSK). The reader seeking a fuller
understanding may refer to the clear and concise description of GPS signal
modulation and the spread spectrum techniques in Introduction to NAVSTAR GPS
User Equipment [Ref. 10:p. 1-10].
Each carrier is also modulated with a 50 bits-per-second (bps)
navigation data message containing satellite status, time, position, orbital
prediction information (ephemeris), a "Hand Over Word" for transition from SPS to
PPS modes, and ionospheric delay predictions for SPS users. Parts of this message
are encrypted for military use.
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3. Control Segment
This segment is made up of one Master Control Station at Falcon Air
Force Base (Colorado Springs, Colorado) and four monitor stations around the
world. The monitor stations collect satellite ranging and timing data, which is
passed to the Master Control Station for processing. The resulting satellite orbital
position and clock error information is sent to a ground antenna site for upload to
the satellite for later retransmission to its users. The Master is also responsible
for controlling orbital corrections.
4. User Segment.
There are many makes and models of receivers available for various
applications: military or civilian; navigation, differential reference station,
surveying or time transfer; single- or dual-frequency; hand-held or vehicle
mounted, and many others. The following will be a very brief overview of this
segment of the GPS. The reader seeking a fuller understanding may refer to the
excellent description of the generic GPS receiver in Langley's "The GPS Receiver:
An Introduction" [Ref. 12:p. 50-53].
a. Receiver Components
User equipment may be broken down into the following conceptual
components:
• Antenna and Associated Preamplifier: convert electromagnetic energy into
electric current over the desired frequency range.
• Radio Frequency (RF) front end section: translate the L-band signals down to
a lower intermediate frequency (IF) more easily processed in the rest of the
receiver.
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• Signal Tracker: Isolate the signals from each satellite in order to allow the
receiver to measure their pseudoranges. This signal processing function will
be discussed in the following subsections.
• Microprocessor-Controller: performs overall operation of the receiver and
navigation processing of the pseudoranges.
• Command Entry and Display Unit: the keypad and display screen. In some




The GPS receiver determines the time of arrival of each satellite
signal by synchronizing an internal signal having that satellite's code with the
satellite's received signal. This is called code-tracking. Each satellite gives its
exact time and position of transmission. The receiver measures the time of
reception to compute travel time as "pseudo-ranges"; these are not true ranges,
because of the receiver clock time bias error included in them. Pseudoranges from
four or more satellites enable the GPS receiver to determine position and time.
Essentially, the receiver solves for four unknowns (three dimensions and time)
with four known satellites, and ultimately position, velocity, and precise time.
In addition to the code-tracking measurement, it is also possible to
phase-lock onto the carrier. Carrier measurements can be used to directly
calculate velocity as well as improve position estimates.
c. Receiver Designs
Signal tracking techniques can be grouped into three different
approaches: multi-channel parallel, multiplexed, and sequential designs. In the
multi-channel parallel design, one channel is dedicated to tracking the signal of
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one satellite. This gives the best performance, but costs the most. In the
multiplex design, each satellite signal is sampled in turn, very rapidly. This design
has the multi-channel feature of "continuous" tracking, but at a reduced signal-to-
noise ratio. In the sequential design, the receiver dwells for a short time on each
satellite. The receiver goes through a "mini-reacquisition" of each satellite during
each cycle (which is typically 2 to 5 seconds long).
Recent advances in digital technology are making multi-channel
parallel "all-satellites-in-view" receivers increasingly cost-effective. A technique
referred to as baseband processing uses one RF (analog) channel to down-convert
and digitize the IF signal; code and carrier tracking is subsequently performed
digitally with software on many discrete channels. Since the samples are taken
(i.e., analog to digital conversion performed) prior to correlation, no further analog
circuitry is required for any number of simultaneous tracking channels.
5. Navigational Geometry
Given two position lines to establish one's position in any navigation
problem, it is best if they cross at right angles. The certainty of the position
degrades if the angle becomes smaller, until total confusion results with parallel
lines. The measure used to quantify this factor in the uncertainty of a fix is
Dilution Of Precision (DOP). In the Horizontal plane it is called HDOP, and in
three dimensions it is called Position DOP, or PDOP. Generally speaking, the
smaller the DOP value the more precise the position. [Ref. 10:p. 3-7]
The ideal geometry for a GPS three dimensional fix with four satellites
in view is: one directly overhead, and three equally spaced about the horizon, just
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above the horizon "masking angle". The volume of the tetrahedron thus formed is
a good indicator of the merit of the fix geometry [Ref. 13]. Situations may arise
where the satellite geometry degrades so badly that no reliable position may be
determined, even though the satellites and the user equipment are operating
perfectly.
6. GPS Integrity
A GPS receiver typically utilizes health and navigation information
transmitted by satellites, as well as its own satellite geometry algorithms to
estimate the overall merit. Some satellite health indicators and operating
parameters are monitored within the satellite, and users may be notified of
detectable internal failures within six seconds. For more subtle failures, GPS
satellites are monitored more than 95% of the time by the control segment
monitoring stations. If a problem is detected, the Master Control Station will
change the satellite's navigation message at the next opportunity; unfortunately,
this may take from 15 minutes to several hours [Ref. 9:p. A-35]. This is the major
weakness in the GPS system, especially in the eyes of the aviation community.
One beneficial effect of DGPS service is the provision of this integrity information
over its area of coverage. Three other alternatives are discussed below: RAIM, use
of existing radionavigation transmissions, and a GPS Integrity Channel.
a. RAIM
Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring (RAIM) is a method of
incorporating any available redundant satellite pseudoranges in an algorithm to
check whether one seems to be transmitting unreasonable information. This is
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only possible when satellite geometry is favorable. When 24 satellites are
operational, RAIM should detect a failure over 99.97% of the time. However, if
only 21 are left in the constellation (no spares), an additional failure will only be
detectable about 95% of the time (conservative estimates) [Ref. 14:p. 46].
6. Existing Radionavigation Transmissions
A variation using RAIM has been incorporated in user equipment
sets that utilize another navigation system [Ref. 14:p. 44-48]. Hybrid user sets
that combine pseudoranges from both GPS satellites and Soviet GLONASS are
technically feasible. Their use would increase accuracy (improved DOPs),
availability and integrity. Failures at any transmission source would be detectable
using RAIM algorithms. The proposal to integrate GPS and Loran-C pseudoranges
in one user set to improve availability and integrity follows the same concept,
particularly if Loran-C transmitters were synchronized to GPS time [Ref. 15: pp.
95-109].
c. GPS Integrity Channel
The aviation community is especially interested in making GPS
integrity information available over wide areas. A suitable system for aviation
applications must be capable of alarming within ten seconds of a failure, have very
high availability, and should minimize false alarms [Ref. 16:pp. 27-28].
Implementing the GPS Integrity Channel (GIC) concept would accomplish this.
The FAA is presently planning to implement a GIC network to provide a GPS
integrity service covering most of North America. [In 1991] the agency will
publish a request for proposals for a GIC system, with acquisition of system
components scheduled for 1994 and implementation in 1996... However, the
cost of developing and operating a GIC may prohibit its implementation. [Ref.
14:p. 45]
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It would appear that Inmarsat is developing just this type of
capability in its third generation communications satellites. In August 1990
Inmarsat demonstrated a prototype system that generated a spread spectrum
signal on the ground, relayed it through a frequency-shifting geostationary
satellite, and received the necessary "GPS look-alike" information on the ground.
The idea is to rapidly transmit information on any failing satellites in the format of
a navigation message that can be handled by a slightly modified GPS receiver.
Eventually, it may also be possible for the precision of time and ephemeris to be
improved to where the GIC communications satellite could also be used for an
additional pseudorange [Ref. 17:p.91]. In November 1990 the Inmarsat Council
approved the inclusion of a navigation repeater on board third generation Inmarsat
satellites. This is intended to permit interested agencies (e.g., the FAA and the
European CNES) to have a functioning GIC in place when GPS becomes fully
operational. [Ref. 18:pp. 35-36]
7. Time
The result of every SPS fix is the synchronization of the receiver's clock
with those in the GPS satellites to within 167 nanoseconds (one sigma) [Ref. 9:p.
A-32]. Using two receivers to accomplish this time transfer improves the result by
another factor of ten; this makes GPS based time transfer the most accurate
method available for synchronizing clocks between the national standards
laboratories [Ref. ll:p. 63].
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C. DIFFERENTIAL GPS
Differential operation of GPS potentially offers accuracies of 2 to 10 meters
for dynamic navigation applications and better than 2 meters for stationary
applications [Ref. 7:p. 1-8]. The basic concept of differential GPS is similar to that
which has also been successfully employed to improve the accuracy of Loran-C,
Omega, and Transit. In addition, differential operation would effectively serve as a
GPS integrity monitor, alerting the user whenever a particular satellite
pseudorange was so far out of tolerance as to be unusable, even with a differential
correction.
1. Description of the Technique
A GPS reference receiver is placed at a surveyed location. By
comparing the known satellite range with measured ranges produced by GPS
(using SPS), corrections to each satellite's pseudorange can be determined. These
corrections can then be broadcast to nearby DGPS equipment sets, which use them
to improve their range measurements. [Ref. 7:p. 1-11]
The differential technique corrects pseudorange bias errors due to
causes outside the user equipment. In the case of GPS, the major sources of error
are the following [Ref. 7:p. 1-9]:
• Ionospheric delays: signal propagation group delay, which can be as much as
20 to 30 meters during the day and 3 to 6 meters at night. In the two-
frequency mode of operation of the PPS, this effect is largely removed by
applying the inverse square-law dependence of delay on frequency.
• Tropospheric delays: signal propagation delays caused by the lower
atmosphere. While the delays are as much as 30 meters at low satellite
elevation angles, they are quite consistent and can be modeled. Variations in
the index of refraction can cause differences (between reference station and
user) in signal delays of 1 to 3 meters for satellites at low elevation angles.
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• Ephemeris error: differences between the actual satellite location and the
location predicted by the satellite orbital data. Normally these are less than
3 meters.
• Satellite clock errors: differences between the satellite clock time and that
predicted by the satellite data. The oscillator that times the satellite signal
is free-running. The GPS ground control system monitors clock drift. Clock
drift information is provided to the GPS receiver through the use of satellite
navigation data. The GPS receiver decodes the data and adjusts the signal
timing accordingly.
• Selective Availability errors: the above-described errors in the ephemeris and
satellite clock are increased at each satellite for security reasons. GPS PPS
users have access to information on these errors and can eliminate them
entirely.
Consistent satellite clock errors are corrected by differential operation,
as long as both the reference and user receivers are using the same satellite data.
Ephemeris errors, unless they are very large (30 meters or more), are similarly
compensated by differential operation. Selective availability errors affecting the
timing of the signals are compensated by differential operation in the short term,
but the corrections lose their validity over time. For users near the reference
station, the respective signal paths to the satellites are sufficiently close so that
ionospheric and tropospheric compensation is almost complete. However, as the
user to reference station separation is increased, the different paths to the
satellites may be sufficiently different that the atmospheric variations cause the
delays to differ significantly. This results in an error that will be greater at larger
user to reference station separations and time delays. [Ref. 7:p. 1-8,9]
Thus, the baseline distance between the differential reference station
and the user, and the age of a correction when it is applied to the measured
pseudorange by the user are the DGPS service design factors that degrade the
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accuracy of the user's solution. They result in "spatial decorrelation errors" and
"time decorrelation errors", respectively.
These effects are illustrated graphically in Figures 2-1, 2-2, and 2-3
[Ref. 19]. The impact of time delay on one pseudorange may be seen in Figure 2-1;
the graph shows predicted pseudorange error and actual pseudorange error
observations on two different days in 1989 while Satellite #14 appeared to be
under the influence of selective availability. This is discussed in detail in a 1990
Institute of Navigation paper [Ref. 20]. The estimated effect of distance is shown
on Figure 2-2. The precise numbers on the three dimensional graph of Figure 2-3
depend on many other factors, including the presence of selective availability and
the satellite geometry at the moment.
2. Description of Components
Terminology used to describe the necessary functional parts of a DGPS
service varies in the published literature. As discussed in Chapter IV, there are
many possible ways the DGPS corrections could be transmitted. There are also a
wide variety of configurations that could be adopted to implement DGPS Service by
any given type of transmitter, as is discussed in paragraph 3. Furthermore, the
technology is undergoing rapid change. For these reasons, the components of
DGPS service will be discussed only in very general terms; the referenced sources
contain more specific implementation details.
In this thesis, DGPS is discussed in terms of five basic, functional
components: a differential reference station, a broadcast node, network
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19: Taken from G. Nard, Sercel]
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Figure 2-3 . DGPS Coverage Cube [After Ref
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conceptual components might be physically grouped in many different ways, but in
general, they interact as illustrated in figure 2-4. This shows a terrestrial
broadcast node. However, a satellite-based system would relay the signal through
a geostationary satellite above the GPS constellation (not shown). System control
and integrity monitor location are design dependent and may vary from that shown
in Figure 2-4. The information flow may be simplistically tracked through a
properly functioning system as follows:
• The GPS SPS satellite signal is received at the differential reference station.
A pseudorange correction is determined by finding the adjustment necessary
to bring the observed pseudorange into agreement with the surveyed
reference station position.
• The correction is passed through network communications to the broadcast
node.
• The broadcast node transmits the correction information on the appropriate
radio frequency (e.g., radiobeacon MF or satellite UHF).
• The broadcast integrity monitor within the broadcast coverage area receives
the correction information and checks its integrity. A report of satisfactory
operation is made via network communications.
• A user within the coverage area receives the correction through DGPS
broadcast receiving equipment, turns off its normal GPS ionospheric and
tropospheric corrections, and applies the DGPS information to pseudoranges
received directly from the GPS satellites.
a. Differential Reference Station
This component contains a GPS antenna and receiver, a data
processor, a data formatter and an interface to the network communications link
[Ref. 7:p. 3-2]. The GPS receiver monitors the error in the received signal from
each GPS satellite in view, and generates pseudoranges. The data processor uses
the station's known position coordinates to determine the corrections. The data
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Figure 2-4 . Conceptual DGPS Components
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formatter incorporates these into the RTCM SC-104 message form. Other
functions performed here may include the first level of DGPS integrity monitoring
(using an independent GPS receiver) and data logging. The differential reference
station may be locally or remotely controlled [Ref. 21 :p. 81.
The RTCM supports the use of a high-quality atomic clock with a
differential reference station [Ref. 7:p. 3-6]. Its precise time measurements allow
more exact tracking of the GPS signals. This precise time is also needed to
maintain consistent clock bias in the transmission of RTCM "Message Type 9"
(rapidly changing DGPS corrections). However, the issue is not decided, and
research continues in regard to this requirement:
With the current new reference receiver hardware supplying regular GPS
carrier data on all channels, these new filter designs can operate on crystal
clocks and achieve accuracy equivalent to that of a reference station driven
by a rubidium frequency standard. [Ref. 22:p. 187]
b. Network Communications
The data to be broadcast are transformed into a data stream
suitable for intra-system communication. For example, this link might be a
dedicated commercial telephone line or a microwave radio link between the
differential reference station and the broadcast node. Both the control of this
circuit and the coding of the data are distinct from the functions of the differential
reference station. [Ref. 21:p. 8]
c. Broadcast Node
The corrections (structured according to the RTCM SC-104 format)
are transformed into radio signals that can be received by mobile users in the
coverage area. The description of the signal transmitted from the broadcast node
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(the "broadcast service standard") is not laid out by the RTCM recommendations,
but will be important information for equipment manufacturers and users once
defined [Ref. 21:p. 8]. The RTCM describes this function as follows:
In its simplest form the data link continuously carries the differential GPS
data message without interruption, at a constant data rate of at least 50
baud.... However, it is of no concern to the receiver whether the data is
transmitted continuously or in bursts, or whether protocol overhead is added.
For example, ... preamble, parity, and even error correction bits [could be
added before transmission and] stripped off at the receiver end, and the
differential correction bits would be stored in the buffer, to be transferred to
the receiver at will.
Differential GPS broadcasts intended for general public use would require
that the data link be a standard, published design. For non-public use,
however, the reference station, data link, and receivers could be part of an
integrated differential GPS system. In such a case, the data might be
encrypted to limit the service to paying customers. [Ref. 7:p. 3-9]
d. Broadcast Integrity Monitor
This is equipment that monitors the DGPS service broadcasts and
GPS signals to determine the level of performance being provided. This
information is used to control the operation of the DGPS service and guarantee
that the advertised level of performance is being maintained. It performs the
second level of DGPS Service integrity monitoring, assuming that the first level
was performed at the differential reference station. [Ref. 21:p. 9]
Since the differential reference station is broadcasting messages on
all satellites in view, the broadcast integrity monitor can not be an ordinary user
equipment set monitoring its own position [Ref. 23:p. 3]. It has to check to ensure
that each pseudorange correction obtained from the broadcast does not differ more
than a specified amount from its own observations; if it does, an alarm is
generated. When all components are functioning properly, the broadcast integrity
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monitor will provide frequent (perhaps continuous) feedback to the differential
reference station.
The broadcast integrity monitor is really performing two services:
• It checks the validity of the corrections generated by the reference station
and modulated onto the broadcast. For this purpose, the monitor need only
be far enough away from the reference station to ensure its GPS antenna is
in a different multi-path environment.
• It checks the strength of the broadcast signal. For this purpose, the monitor
must be at least far enough away from the broadcast node to avoid being
overpowered by the transmission. At least one integrity monitor is required
per broadcast, regardless of the number of differential reference stations per
broadcast node.
The site optimally placed for one function may be far removed from the optimal
location for the other. The differential reference station to broadcast node ratio
will be significant in determining how many integrity monitors of what type are
required. Hereafter, this study simplifies discussion by assuming that there is one
integrity monitor per reference station, though this need not be the case with some
configurations (e.g., dedicated satellite channel, VHF/FM channel).
e. User Equipment
This component consists of two subparts: the broadcast receiver and
the GPS/DGPS navigation set. The broadcast receiver could be a satellite terminal
or a radiobeacon broadcast receiver, for example. The navigation set receives the
GPS signals directly from the GPS satellites and accurately processes them; it then
applies the DGPS corrections from the broadcast receiver for an improved solution.
At this time, user equipment fully capable of RTCM SC-104
differential operation is limited. However, differential capability is being
incorporated as a software addition to an increasing number of GPS navigation
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sets. While DGPS capability is now a justification for a significant price mark-up,
addition of DGPS requires no extra hardware in the navigation set [Ref. 24].
Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that with time and increased competition, the
incremental cost of DGPS-capability over GPS-only capability will be due to the
broadcast receiver.
3. System Architecture
The focus of the cost-effectiveness analysis in Chapter V compares two
systems that differ only with respect to the type of broadcast node; otherwise, they
are assumed to use equivalent system architectures. However, the problem of
optimizing the configuration of other system components could be approached
using the model presented in Chapter V. The following paragraphs touch on some
of the technical issues involved.
As previously mentioned, there are a wide variety of configurations that
could be adopted to implement DGPS Service by a given type of transmitter. Some
of these variations blur the distinction between the components. For example, in
the above discussions, conversion of the differential corrections into RTCM message
formats and any necessary interleaving takes place at the differential reference
station; these tasks could also be performed at the broadcast node.
Whatever broadcast method is selected, a major design task will be
evaluation of the need for incorporation of a control station. Under this concept,
the service provider (Coast Guard) would exercise quality control over subordinate
components from a central location. This would include controlling and monitoring
the health of the subordinate components and network communications. This
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centralized scheme would require development of a complex hardware and software
system, which increases cost and the risk of the project running over schedule.
However, the centralized scheme has several advantages, and they are [Ref. 25J:
a. Availability
Assuming reliable, redundant communications links, the centralized
scheme should result in better availability. It would facilitate identification of the
point of failure in the event of contradictory component health indications. The
faulty component alone could be declared unusable, rather than the whole system.
b. Portability
A control station architecture would facilitate the central collection
of information from all components for forwarding to many broadcast media. The
information might also be more readily archived or forwarded to other users for
post-processing.
c. Technical Flexibility
It would facilitate future system improvements more readily than
an autonomous approach. In many cases, this might require only a software
change at the control station [Ref. 261. This concept would consolidate the
processing of satellite error information from several reference receivers at a
central facility, and could permit "extrapolated" multi-receiver solutions for
improved accuracy. Conceivably, meteorological information could be added.
Potentially fewer reference receivers would be required in this architecture than in
the autonomous approach illustrated above. After this central processing, the
RTCM messages would be forwarded to the broadcast nodes. Once established.
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such a Wide Area Reference Station (WARS) could be assigned additional GPS
related tasks [Ref. 27].
d. Synergy
This architecture could allow integration with the control
mechanisms of other Coast Guard systems, for an overall synergistic effect. Many
types of resource cross- utilization might be possible. The sharing of network
communications links is the most obvious of these. For another example, the same
type of cesium atomic time standards used by Loran-C stations could be utilized by
DGPS reference receivers. Manpower efficiencies could be had by combining
routine watchstander responsibilities.
e. Security
A manned control station would facilitate immediate, centralized
control in the event service must be interrupted in the interest of national security.
This is discussed further in Chapter III.
4. RTCM SC-104 Recommended Standard
The Radio Technical Commission for Maritime services Special
Committee 104, (RTCM SC-104), Differential NAVSTAR/GPS Service, examined
the technical and institutional issues surrounding DGPS services, and published
the following version 2.0 recommendations [Ref.7:p.l-1]:
• Data Message and Format: The message elements that make up the
corrections, the status messages, the station parameters, and other data are
defined. They are structured into a data format similar to that of the GPS
satellite signals, but a variable-length format is employed. These messages
have different levels of finality. Some message types have been "frozen" (i.e.,
they will not be subject to change) and other message types are considered
tentative; see Table 2-2.
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• User Interface: A standard interface is defined which enables DGPS user
equipment to be used in concert with a variety of different data links. This
enables, for example, DGPS user equipment to be used with a satellite or a
radiobeacon data link.
• Pseudolite Design - A particular embodiment of a differential station is the
"Pseudolite", which looks to the user like an extra satellite and obviates the
need for a separate data link for the broadcast of corrections. A design is
proposed which appears to overcome the interface problems associated with
conventional techniques.
The Committee has attempted to address the needs of a wide user
community, including not only marine users but land-based and airborne users.
Both radiolocation and radionavigation applications are supported. A standard
data link interface is defined which will enable a receiver to utilize different data
links to receive corrections. [Ref. 7:pp. 1-2, 4-5]
Message types 60-63 have been reserved specifically at the request of
the Coast Guard to explore the use of multi-purpose data links. If radiobeacons
come into operational data link use, the Coast Guard would like to be able to use
them for more than DGPS data. This general format could be used to transmit
differential Loran-C, differential Omega, weather messages, or Notices to Mariners.
[Ref. 7:p. 4-32]
Frequent updates using "Message Type 1" is a key factor in determining
the accuracy of a RTCM-compatible system; this provides the pseudorange
correction and the rate of change of that correction. These values are used by the
user equipment at time of receipt to differentially correct its own measured GPS
pseudorange. Since its value degrades with time, it is important to maximize the
rate of transmission of the Type 1 messages. Estimations of that rate of
transmission are detailed by the RTCM recommended standards document. These
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estimates assume the minimum 50 bps data rate with selective availability in
effect, and account for interleaving of other message types as necessary. The more
satellites in view, the longer the time between updates of any one satellite [Ref.
7:p. 4-33]:
• Four Satellites: repeat Type 1 Message every 6.67 sec.
• Seven Satellites: repeat Type 1 Message every 11.11 sec.
• Eleven Satellites: repeat Type 1 Message every 18.18 sec.
40






1 Fixed Differential GPS Corrections
2 Fixed Delta DGPS Corrections
3 Fixed Reference Sta. Parameters
4 Tentative Surveying
5 Tentative Constellation Health
6 Fixed Null Frame
7 Tentative Radiobeacon Almanacs
8 Tentative Pseudolite Almanacs
9 Fixed High Rate DGPS Corrections
10 Reserved P-Code DGPS Corrections (all)
11 Reserved C/A-Code L1,L2 Delta Corrns
12 Reserved Pseudolite Sta. Parameters
13 Tentative Ground Transmitter Parameters
14 Reserved Surveying Auxiliary Message
15 Reserved Ionosphere (Troposphere) Msg.
16 Fixed Special Message
17 Tentative Ephemeris Almanac
18-59 — Undefined
60-63 Reserved Differential Loran-C Messages
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in. NATURE OF THE PROBLEM
Without a well-considered foundation of objectives and assumptions, the
effort expended in Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) may be wasted. It may
recommend a system not suited to the problem. The objectives in this chapter lay
the foundation for determining the criteria by which effectiveness will be
measured. The assumptions and considerations documented in Section B continue
this explanation by addressing several issues pertinent to DGPS service design.
A. OBJECTIVES
This section addresses the process of setting objectives, then discusses each
tentative objective associated with the following "missions":
• Harbor and Harbor Approach Radionavigation
• Coastal Phase Radionavigation
• Coast Guard Cutter Precise Positioning
• Vessel Traffic Control
• Precise Air Navigation
• Support of Other Agencies' DGPS Missions
• Support of Other Radionavigation Services
1. Definitions
The meanings of "objective" and "requirement" vary in the referenced
sources. For the purpose of this study, the noun "objective" means a general goal,
usually stated in terms of a capability to perform a mission: harbor radionavigation
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capability, for example. Objectives drive "requirements". System requirements
more specifically define what level of performance must be provided by a proposed
system to bridge the gap between what is possible now and a desired objective; for
example, ten meter (2drms) accuracy with 99.9% reliability might be a requirement
driven by the Harbor Radionavigation objective. System requirements should
quantify what level of performance should be achieved rather than how it should
be achieved.
2. Process of Defining Objectives
Acquisition policy and systems engineering texts are unanimous in
stressing the importance of user input and organizational agreement on objectives.
Without this, a project is more likely to be diverted or cut completely in
mid-course, or to produce the wrong system. Objectives are often hard to
formulate, however. In the public sector, both external demand and internal
support inputs are diffused through the complex policy making structure of the
government. Participating institutions include the Congress, the president and the
executive agencies, and the general public and special interest groups. [Ref. 5:p. 29]
a. Incremental Decision Making
For a federal agency such as the Coast Guard, objective setting is
complicated by the gradual nature of decision making in the public sector. The
perceived needs of the country are constantly changing with the time, as discussed
in Chapter I.C.3. This means that detailed objective setting efforts may be wasted
if attempted with too much rigor. In Managing a Federal Agency. Bragaw
discusses how incrementalism affects Coast Guard policy making:
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... a federal agency makes a decision and then adapts or adjusts the decision
in response to the forces it experiences after the first decision is made. The
discussion of the "issue-attention" cycle...points out that many of the issues
an agency deals with go through a cycle of relative importance, and decisions
made by a group or an agency fluctuate with this cycle. The proponents of
incrementalism point out that, although the process can be termed "muddling
through" when looked at from a distance, it may actually be quite responsive
to the democratic system of government.... One should avoid the idea that
many Coast Guard decisions were made as part of a profound national policy.
The evidence... strongly indicates that decisions made at any one point in time
are products of the forces at work at that moment....This is not to say that
the concept of an incremental decision-making process is wrong. Quite the
contrary—an idea may develop and progress until it becomes an element of
national policy. This development does not necessarily occur, however,
because any group or committee plans it or says it will happen this way....
[Ref. 5:pp. 43, 235-236]
b. User Demand
In high-technology endeavors, the users often don't know what they
want until they get it. What comes first, the system or the requirement? In the
case of GPS, the Coast Guard radionavigation user survey completed in January
1989 indicated that two thirds of recreational and small commercial vessel
operators had no knowledge or experience with GPS; only 3% had actually used it
[Ref. 28:p. 231. Considering that GPS is scheduled to be fully operational in 1993,
the problem is particularly acute. A tradeoff exists between the risk of
underestimating capabilities that the user community will come to want and
over-designing capabilities for which no demand will develop [Ref. 29]. Until a
prototype is available, even the designers, familiar with system potential, are
merely guessing what applications an unprecedented capability will lead to. A
historical example is the use of Loran-C with automated dependent surveillance to
track cargo movements:
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Technological change usually brings forth new applications that transcend
the need for which an innovation was first developed, but such new
applications often raise managerial objections because they go beyond the
area the organization serves. This certainly happened in Loran-C; a user
constituency developed that was much larger than the original group of
mariners and aviators. Transportation and inventory control of goods as they
are shipped by one transportation mode then shifted to other modes until
they reach the final distribution centers are huge potential applications.
There are many others, made technically possible by miniaturized receivers
that can be interrogated to "send back" their position at any time. [Ref. 5:pp.
146-1471
c. Technological Uncertainty
Just as a future change in technology may increase demand for
services, it may also lead to the project being overtaken by events. Despite
in-depth analysis from the start, unexpected technological advances may dictate
limited fielding or abortion of the program altogether. An example (in the case of
DGPS) would be drastic improvements in unaided GPS system accuracy and
integrity from satellite and receiver technological advances, combined with a
change in national policy to make such precision available to the public. If PPS
were to be released for public use, and an integrity channel were available, the
need for DGPS at all would deserve revaluation.
d. Plan for Incremental Growth
A key to managing a project such as DGPS under such dynamic
conditions is to have a flexible plan that will adapt to changing objectives as time
progresses. The project plan should be modular, so as to allow implementation in
increments; such adaptability improves the project's budget survivability [Ref. 30].
Modular design also facilitates preplanned product improvement; this will be
considered further in section B.6.
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3. DGPS Objectives Listing
Why is a DGPS system needed in the first place? The Coast Guard has
addressed the possible objectives by proposing applications in planning and
budgeting documents, including the DGPS Tentative Operational Requirement
(TOR) [Ref. 31], various G-N Issue Memoranda on DGPS, a Resource Change
Proposal (RCP) [Ref. 3], and the 1990 Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) [Ref. 9].
These plans are changing continually. Additional objectives outside these sources
are not addressed, although there are many in the referenced literature; for
example, neither radionavigation on the inland waterways nor the 13 militarily
oriented applications itemized in a NATO guide to GPS [Ref. 10: p. 11-4] will be
analyzed. However, the discussion after each of the following general objectives
includes the author's observations.
a. Harbor and Harbor Approach (HHA) Radionavigation
DGPS service has the potential to meet the accuracy, reliability and
integrity needed in this phase, as outlined in Chapter II and in the FRP [Ref. 9:p.
2-3].
There was not a strong demand for DGPS level accuracy expressed
by the maritime public as of 1989; most navigators find existing systems, such as
Loran-C, adequate for their needs [Ref. 28:pp. 24,45,46,79]. However, the previous
discussion of Section 2.b applies: users don't really understand the utility of the
increased capability until it is available. The marketing of products that apply
DGPS will increase demand. In particular, the technology of electronic display
systems is complementary with DGPS-level accuracy and fix-interval:
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It would appear that a major step in maximizing the effectiveness of
radionavigation systems in the harbor/harbor approach environment is to
present the position information on some form of electronic display. This
would provide a ship's captain, pilot, or navigator a continual reference, as
opposed to plotting "outdated" fixes on a chart to show the recent past. It is
also recognized that the role of the existing radionavigation system decreases
in this harbor/harbor approach environment, while the role of visual aids and
radar escalates...a user must be able to relate the data to immediate
positioning needs. This is not practical if one attempts to plot fixes on a
chart in the traditional way. To utilize radionavigation information that is
presented at 6- to 10-second intervals on a moving vessel, some form of an
automatic display is required. Technology is available which presents
radionavigation information along with other data. [Ref. 9:pp. 2-26]
DGPS potentially offers the user a trade-off between safety and
economic efficiency. On one hand, HHA DGPS service should enhance maritime
safety by reducing the number of ship groundings, especially those due to human
error (e.g., confusion when operating in unfamiliar waters at night). Alternatively,
a vessel could use DGPS to reduce time and fuel expenditures by taking the fastest
route, rather than "going around" to a safer channel, or waiting for favorable
conditions (optimal tide or current state, improved visibility, or reduced traffic
congestion). There is a tremendous risk of accident if a vessel master accepts this
finer margin of error, but loses DGPS or the electronic display system and is forced
to immediately shift to visual navigation by buoys.
If vessels use DGPS to enhance safe operation, the threat to the
environment from spilled oil or other hazardous materials would be reduced. A
shiphandling simulator experiment conducted in 1988 supports this contention. A
simulated ten meter (2drms) accuracy on a graphical electronic display in
visibilities as low as 0.25 nautical mile allowed commercial vessel pilots to perform
as good as or better than they had performed when visually piloting in unrestricted
visibility [Ref. 4:p. 325]. However, the same evaluation of 18 meter accuracy
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resulted in statistically poorer performance than visual piloting, most significantly
so in turns [Ref. 32:p. 20].
The TOR mentions the potential of DGPS to have integrity
sufficient to allow "sole means" use; this is a term typically used in aviation
navigation literature that implies a very high degree of dependability. However, it
should not be construed to rescind the venerable "prudent mariner" caveat (printed
in the margins of nautical charts) against relying solely on any single aid to
navigation [Ref. 33:p. 1]. Under this caveat, DGPS could provide "primary means"
with other sources (such as visual aids, radar, and fathometer) acting as checks as
appropriate. Indeed, if "sole-means" were to imply safe navigation in the absence
of visual aids in zero visibility, the 1988 simulator experiment indicates that DGPS
level accuracy (10m, 2drms) may not be adequate to the task:
The experimental results do not support the use of the types of radio aid
systems evaluated during this experiment as a principal means of navigation
under zero visibility conditions. The primary concerns focus on the need for
(a) additional research into the role of an RA [Radio Aid] device in
negotiating turns under zero visibility conditions and (b) additional insight
into the minimum training requirements for using such devices. [Ref. 32:p.
30]
b. Coastal Phase Radionavigation
Early planning calls for DGPS coverage to extend 20 kilometers
seaward from each critical U.S. waterway [Ref. 31]. This would include the coastal
areas of the continental U.S., Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico. However, the
remote areas of Alaska and Hawaii, where maritime commerce is quite infrequent,
and the navigable rivers may not be covered [Ref. 3:p. 2]. The FRP specifies that
in the "coastal phase" outward of harbor approaches the ship will be provided with
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a safe path of water at least one mile wide [Ref. 9:p. 2-3]. This is not a
particularly demanding environment in comparison to the HHA phase just
discussed, and the existing GPS and Loran-C coverage would seem very adequate
for safe navigation. However, the 20 kilometer swath does give a comfortable
transition zone wherein the inbound navigator may verify reception of a DGPS
signal and proper operation of the ship's receiver.
It does not appear that DGPS would provide much additional utility
over unaided GPS beyond the Coastal Phase. The FRP specifies that 100 meter
accuracy is more than adequate for safe navigation in the Ocean Phase. One
rationale for extending coverage further than 20 kilometers out would be to have
DGPS provide integrity information for the GPS system, notifying users when a
satellite is unusable. However, it is likely that hybrid Loran-C/GPS receivers, a
geostationary satellite GPS integrity channel, or Receiver Autonomous Integrity
Monitoring (RAIM) will eventually provide this function, as discussed in Chapter
II, Section B.
c. Coast Guard Cutter Precise Positioning
DGPS accuracy is considerably above that available with unaided
GPS; this precision is desired for improved effectiveness and productivity in
performing Coast Guard duties, such as buoy positioning. The coverage, integrity
and reliability required in all these missions are generally less demanding than
those just discussed for HHA Radionavigation, while required accuracy is roughly
the same.
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(1) Aids to Navigation. The USCG Research and Development
Center (R&D Center) at Groton, CT, has already deployed prototype DGPS
technology for evaluation in buoy positioning. The stated accuracy goal for this
mission is five to ten meters (2drms) [Ref. 21:p. 13]. Operational demonstrations
have proven the potential of DGPS to replace horizontal sextant angles as the
primary means of positioning buoys.
The Automated Aid Positioning System (AAPS) is a laptop
computer-based tool that allows real-time display and comparison of horizontal
sextant and DGPS determined positions. The integrated DGPS-AAPS tool was
adopted with enthusiasm by the operating personnel for several reasons:
• The accuracy provided by DGPS-AAPS was conservatively estimated at 7.7
meters (2drms). Although this DGPS fix accuracy was not shown to be
superior to that expected from horizontal sextant angles measured between
landmarks ashore, it is certainly adequate to the task. Furthermore, DGPS
removes the danger of error due to misidentification of landmarks, which can
occur when using horizontal sextant angles. [Ref. 21:pp. 15-18]
• Productivity of aids to navigation crews is improved. The DGPS-AAPS
combination provides a smooth, responsive display that allows dynamic
repositioning of aids. For example, an off-station buoy that required "hours"
to reposition using horizontal angles required only five minutes to drag to its
desired position with the prototype system [Ref. 21:p. 17]. DGPS also
provides the potential to continue work when landmarks are lost in low
visibility.
• The system is easy to operate and reliable. Users required little training.
DGPS is much easier to install, maintain, and operate than other microwave
positioning systems used by the Research and Development Center. [Ref.
21:p. 6]
(2) Vessel Tactical Data Determination. This involves precisely
plotting the position of a vessel while it is underway to determine its turning,
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stopping, and accelerating characteristics. The R&D Center has developed
software for this task which is now in the public domain.
(3) Precise Track Following. Coast Guard vessel effectiveness
would be significantly enhanced in transiting preplanned tracks in support of
Search and Rescue (SAR), mine-related operations, and ice operations.
d. Vessel Traffic Control
The recognized potential of DGPS for enhancing Vessel Traffic
Service dependent surveillance has strengthened the political stimulus for a Coast
Guard DGPS system. As was discussed in Chapter I, the Exxon Valdez grounding
and massive oil spill in Prince William Sound, Alaska, brought the task of
monitoring the precise position of tanker traffic to the forefront of national
attention.
(1) Vessel Traffic Service (VTS). A VTS system is intended to
promote safety and efficiency by monitoring the area traffic, making information
available about navigational hazards and vessel movements, and in certain cases,
enforcing adherence to good navigational practice and communication procedures.
To do this, the VTS must continually know the position of the participating vessels.
While the master must remain in positive control of his or her own vessel, the VTS
may govern the use of restricted space [Ref. 34:p. 16]. Typically, the VTS monitors
the area by correlating vessel radio calls with their images detected by radar or
video camera. However, DGPS could be used instead, in conjunction with
dependent surveillance.
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(2) Automated Dependent Surveillance (ADS). Dependent
surveillance means that the target of interest is an active participant in the
surveillance system, and actively transmits a message containing identification and
position information. Voice reporting without supplementary monitoring is the
simplest type of dependent surveillance; however, this method lacks any
enforcement mechanism, and is often in error due to untimely or erroneous
reporting. An Automated Dependent Surveillance (ADS) system uses a radio
circuit to automatically transmit position information from a vessel of interest to a
monitoring facility. A radionavigation system (such as GPS aided by DGPS)
provides the position information directly to this circuit.
(3) ADS IRadar Tradeoffs. The lack of enforceability is the major
drawback to ADS, compared to radar:
Vessels entering a VTS must be detected and identified in order for the
VTS to be able to track vessel movement. The ability to detect an
unwilling or unusual vessel is essential to the operation of the VTS....
[Ref. 35:p. 40]
On the other hand, an ADS system has some definite
advantages over a radar/voice radio arrangement. ADS eliminates possible
confusion in correlating a radar return with a VTS participant, and eases language
barrier difficulties. Also, in harbors with large areas to be monitored it may be far
more efficient to use ADS (perhaps with supplementary radar or video at one or
two key points) than to try to cover the entire area by radar. For this reason, the
Coast Guard has chosen ADS over expansion of the existing radar system at VTS
Prince William Sound. [Ref. 35: p. 34]
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DGPS-based ADS would provide a desirable improvement in
accuracy over radar. For some VTS applications accuracy is vital, as explamed by
a VTS officer:
Consider two large ships in heavy fog approaching each other. The VTS
watchstander's radar and computer tell him this could be dangerous,...Since
he has been tracking the ships by name, he can make immediate radio
contact to the bridge of each vessel. [Ref. 36]
However, unless the channel is very wide, or the radar is close to the subject
vessels, radar accuracy may not be adequate to the task of detecting a vessel
straying from its side of a channel.
In normal practice radar range is set for a twelve nautical mile observation
radius... this creates a maximum range error of 240 yards and a maximum
azimuth error of 1250 yards... these error ranges decrease linearly as a
function of the target range. [Ref. 35:p. 581
DGPS would have sufficient accuracy to perform this function.
e. Precise Air Navigation
Coast Guard planning and budgeting documents do not prescribe
DGPS for general aviation use. Planning documents do mention the utility of
precise navigation for Coast Guard aircraft; however, it is not clear that ten meter
(2drms) accuracy is now needed.
DGPS accuracy is not called for outside of the landing approach
area: civil aviation policy states that basic GPS accuracy of 100 meters 2drms is
suitable for all current requirements except precision approach and landing [Ref.
9:p. 4-4]. Airport precision approach and landing is an extremely demanding
environment. For all weather operations, a vertical accuracy of 0.6 meters is calleH
for [Ref. 9:p. 2-20]. The Instrument Landing System (ILS) was introduced in 1940
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to serve this need, and is the standard civil landing system in the US and abroad
through 1998 by international agreement. The Microwave Landing System (MLS)
offers higher accuracy and greater flexibility, and has been selected to gradually
replace ILS [Ref. 9:pp. 3-27, 3-28].
As was discussed in Chapter II, the current GPS satellite and
control segment failure warning system does not warn of out-of-tolerance
conditions soon enough [Ref. 9:pp. 3-40, 4-4J. DGPS could satisfy this integrity
need. However, supplementary integrity monitoring techniques other than DGPS
are being developed and may eventually correct this shortcoming, as previously
discussed.
Thus, DGPS isn't currently intended for general navigational use by
the aviation community. However, despite the strong official commitment to ILS
and MLS, DOD, NASA, and the FAA are continuing to experiment with promising
DGPS technology for aircraft approach and landing. In 1990, NASA completed 36
automated landings with simulated zero visibility using a DGPS navigation system
integrated with an inertial navigation system. The same team is exploring DGPS
utility in controlling taxiway traffic in low visibility [Ref. 37: p. 16]. DOD, in
coordination with NASA and FAA, is investigating the feasibility of DGPS for
landing at improvised sites using a light, person-transportable assembly. [Ref. 9:pp.
4-12, 4-13]
f. Support of Other Agencies 1 DGPS Missions
Planning documents state that any Coast Guard DGPS system
should be compatible with other agencies' (e.g., NOAA, DMA, FAA and Army Corps
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of Engineers) intended uses of reference station data and broadcasts [Ref. 31:p. 4].
For example, the experiments with DGPS aviation applications just discussed could
potentially fall in this category. The FAA's apparent intent to implement a GIC
network could also be a consideration. DGPS growth may come to resemble Loran,
which was initially intended for coastal maritime use but has recently been
expanded to provide mid-continent coverage for aviators.
The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is worthy of special note here
because of its research to apply DGPS in support of peacetime hydrographic
surveying and dredging in U.S. waters. The Corps of Engineers is investigating,
with the intention of developing, a real-time DGPS carrier phase tracking system
for very accurate positioning (a few centimeters) of moving platforms [Ref. 9:p.
4-13]. This technique appears to be limited to use within 20 kilometers of the
reference station now, but it is possible that interpolating/extrapolating from
multiple networked stations could extend this range. The design prototype using
one reference station is currently scheduled for delivery by September 1993 [Ref.
38:p. 43].
g. Support of Other Radionavigation Services
Providing DGPS service would have an inherent synergy with the
Coast Guard's responsibilities as the lead agency for Civil GPS Service. DGPS
could help detect GPS problems and notify the user community, a service which
the existing GPS does not always provide in a timely fashion [Ref. 9:p. A-35]. The
system would also help the Coast Guard validate reports from the user community
on GPS performance problems. Interconnection between DGPS operations and the
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Civil GPS service could be a future requirement. The recorded GPS information
may become an element of an accident investigation, and should be safeguarded as
a potential legal document. The GPSIC could serve as a depository for such
historical DGPS information, which might also be useful for post-processing in
non-navigational applications, such as hydrographic surveys. [Ref. 31:p. 4]
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS
This section documents several assumptions and issues surrounding DGPS
service design. The assumptions bound the selection problem; there are far too
many variables to consider all major permutations of DGPS implementations in
the CEA process. For this study, we limit full analysis to two candidates that
differ only in the manner in which the DGPS corrections are broadcast to the
maritime users (by radiobeacon and by satellite). However, the considerations
discussed here are reflected in the CEA structure developed in Chapter V, such
that the model could be applied to evaluate alternatives to the assumptions in the
following paragraphs.
1. Preplanned Product Improvement (P*I)
The assumption is made that a P3! approach will be used to develop a
DGPS system which meets existing needs, and yet is designed to be expanded to
incorporate new technology as it becomes available without developing a new
system. This provides an early delivery of a simplified and affordable system
(Coast Guard planning targets January 1, 1996) [Ref. 31: p. 2]. Probably the most
critical aspect of the P?I approach is the modularizing of the system to minimize
future integration and retrofit problems. However, it also requires extra
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capabilities which may not be utilized initially; such as power, cooling, memory,
space, and communications ports. This entails increased initial cost, technical
complexity, and vulnerability to "gold plating" criticism. [Ref. 39:p. 5-46 - 5-501
P3! goes beyond planned product improvement, which represents a
change to the system that is generally anticipated but for which the basic system
was not originally designed to accommodate. A classic example of P3 ! is the Apple
II microcomputer:
The Apple II, introduced in 1976, had sales of approximately 500,000 in
1983, a remarkable achievement considering that the 1976-1983 period
represents two or three generations in the rapidly evolving
microcomputer world. Perhaps the most significant design feature of
the Apple II that accounted for this performance is the inclusion of
seven expansion "slots" in the initial design, allowing peripheral cards
to be easily developed and easily inserted into the computer to enhance
its capabilities... Recent additions include cards to make the Apple a
16-bit computer; to introduce new operating systems; to triple speed...
[Ref. 39:p. 5-50].
This P3! approach affects most of the following assumptions in this
section. Issues of standards, communications interfaces, system architecture, user
fees, private sector radionavigation and military security requirements are all
debatable. The CEA alternatives considered assume that the Coast Guard will not
wait until technology is mature and needs are confirmed; instead, it will implement
a simple, adequate system with planned improvement taken into account.
Foresight in application of the P3! approach will permit expansion to incorporate
need and policy changes as well as technology; this facilitates incremental growth,




In this study, it is assumed that compliance with established
international standards is vital. In order to minimize the cost of user equipment,
international consensus should be sought in selecting any radionavigation system
configuration. Vessels should be able to use the same receiver equipment sets, and
expect the same general standards of service in all DGPS equipped ports on their
voyages.
There is intense foreign interest in building DGPS systems.
Several European nations have pioneering programs underway, and cannot be
expected to simply follow a U.S. lead. Unlike Loran, Omega, and GPS; DGPS has
developed internationally, rather than as a primarily U.S. invention. There are
many coordinating bodies that potentially could be, or already are, involved in the
formation of DGPS international standards. The Radio Technical Commission for
Maritime Services (RTCM) already has published recommended standards that are
generalized for possible use with different data links, including radiobeacon or
satellite DGPS transmitters [Ref. 7: p. 1-1]. In addition, the International
Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) continues to foster technical
discussions on DGPS as a part of its goal of developing international
radionavigation guidelines. Traditionally, the International Maritime Organization
(IMO) has provided less stringent radionavigation requirements for the maritime
community than the International Civil Aeronautics Organization (ICAO) does for
aviation [Ref. 9:p. 1-24]. The International Organization for Standards (ISO) and
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International Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee (CCITT) could also
play a role. [Ref. 40:pp. 1-11]
b. Open Systems Interoperability Standards
It is assumed that any desirable U.S. DGPS configuration will have
the following "open systems" characteristics:
• System consists of multi-vendor interoperable modules (i.e., non-proprietary).
• Component module interface definitions are in terms of accepted standards
(e.g., ISO, RTCM).
These guidelines apply to all components of a U.S. DGPS service.
The open systems policy facilitates the writing of non-proprietary, unambiguous
specifications, which encourage competition, in accordance with federal acquisition
policy. It also encourages the re-use of previously developed hardware and
software (either government produced or commercially available "off-the-shelf),
thus reducing costs. Another critical benefit of this open systems policy is that it
allows individual subsystem modules to be replaced for system upgrades; growth
can be accommodated without scrapping the entire old system.
In many areas, foresight will be needed to allow for adaptation to
new standards as they mature. This includes the emerging Federal Information
Processing Standards (FIPS), which specify GOSIP network communication
protocols. GOSIP protocols are based upon the modular and hierarchical ISO Open
Systems Interconnect reference model. Adherence to them allows the
communications subsystem to reap P3! benefits during expected future upgrades
and interconnections. [Ref. 41:pp. 15-24]
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The above concepts also should be applied to the fielded system's
support structure. For example, repair tools would include Modular Automatic
Test equipment, and documentation (configuration management) might use
attractive portions of the DOD's Computer-aided Acquisition and Logistic Support
(CALS) framework [Ref. 42: p. iv].
3. Maritime Data Communications Interface
The choosing of a DGPS broadcast channel to the maritime public
carries implications beyond this one system to Coast Guard mobile communications
systems in general. Looking towards the future: how does the Coast Guard intend
to communicate data with its customers? There are many maritime data
communications initiatives, including:
• The addition of digital selective calling to MF, HF, and VHF will allow the
automatic establishment of communications. The technique may also be used
to automatically make digital transmissions, such as identification, position,
or distress information.
• Narrow Band Direct Printing is being implemented on MF and HF bands to
broadcast teletype-format (digital) safety information to and receive various
calls from the maritime public. These systems are called NAVTEX and
SITOR, respectively.
• Inmarsat-C commercially provided service utilizes smaller, more versatile and
less expensive shipboard antennas that will permit access by many more
vessels to public satellite communications.
Clearly, these initiatives indicate a trend toward increased data
communications between the maritime public and the Coast Guard. Traffic on
these channels could include automated dependent surveillance or other position
reports, Notices to Mariners, radionavigation information (including differential
corrections), weather facsimile, time, and perhaps digital chart corrections
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[Ref. 43:pp. 305, 316]. It will not be acceptable to require the mariner to buy
another radio every time the Coast Guard discovers another data item to be
communicated to or from the public. [Ref. 44:pp. 1-3]
Although a consolidated, standardized data communications interface to
the maritime public is highly desirable, it is assumed that the Coast Guard DGPS
service can not wait to see if or how this would be implemented. The modular P3 !
approach previously discussed will be a vital part of both candidate solutions, such
that either would be able to migrate to a different, standard Coast Guard digital
broadcast channel if and when it matures.
4. System Architecture
For this study, we assume the successful development of integrity
monitoring and control methods that are generally the same for each configuration.
Realistically, the system architecture could be allowed to vary to best suit the
broadcast node, as described in Chapter II, C.2.d. However, this assumption
permits consistent use of the available cost information.
5. User fees
Planning documents require that DGPS "... be designed to protect the
option of user fees for the future" [Ref. 31:p. 3]. Currently, all government
provided radionavigation services are available to any suitably equipped user;
there is no direct fee levied for the use of a specific system. Federal transportation
policy is to institute user fees to recover costs from users of services that provide
benefits to identifiable recipients, above and beyond those benefits accrued by the
general public [Ref. 9:p. 1-23]. It is assumed that any user fee collection would not
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be enforced through incorporating some technical mechanism in the broadcast
signal. Rather, any such fee is assumed to be included in the vessel documentation
or vessel user fee decal issuance process, or imposed upon each DGPS receiver
before it is sold. Any fees do not affect the comparison of alternatives.
6. Private Sector Radionavigation
It will be assumed that DGPS would continue to follow the historical
precedent of U.S. radionavigation systems being operated by the government for
reasons of safety, security and to enhance commerce. It should be recalled that
radionavigation implies guiding the safe movement of a vehicle, as discussed in
Chapter II. This assumption does not affect the continued or expanded use of
existing private sector radiolocation service, which is appropriate for applications
such as positioning and surveying over a limited area. [Ref. 9:p. 1-15, 1-24]
Current Coast Guard regulations (33 CFR 66.01-l(d)) prohibit operation
of private electronic aids to navigation, with the exception of radar beacons
(racons) and shore-based radar stations. In 1988, an "Advance Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking" was published that invited public comment on the possibility of
removing this restriction. Six responses were received: all endorsed allowing
private radionavigation aids, with Coast Guard licensing and monitoring.
Arguments for Coast Guard regulation and monitoring of private radionavigation
aids include:
• Timeliness. Highly accurate radionavigation would be available for mariners
that can afford such services much sooner than DGPS could be implemented
by the Coast Guard. Innovation could also be superior in such a competitive
market.
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• Budget. Coast Guard budget requirements to provide radionavigation
services would be reduced.
However, arguments against private radionavigation aids include:
• Liability. The Coast Guard would have to assume liability in the monitoring
of a privately owned source system over which it would have limited control.
Commercial ventures could remain vulnerable to lawsuits and bankruptcy in
the face of maritime accidents, which could lead to the untimely
discontinuation of service and loss of investment in user equipment.
• User Cost. The high cost of private systems puts them beyond the reach of
most mariners. The overhead of administrative and technical measures
needed to deny non-subscribers access to the commercial service would
increase costs. In contrast, government-provided DGPS would encourage
wide use of a beneficial safety-oriented service.
• Supervisory Complexity. The Coast Guard would incur sizeable
administrative, equipment and field personnel costs in regulating many
private radionavigation systems.
• Regulatory. It is anticipated that merchant vessel regulations will mandate
the carrying of DGPS equipment. It would be undesirable to require the
utilization of a particular commercial provider's service.
• Security. Should a national defense emergency arise in the coverage area, a
government operated system would be more responsive to National Command
Authority direction than numerous private sector systems could be.
For these reasons, the change proposed in 1988 appears unlikely to be
implemented. [Ref. 45:pp. 1-2]
7. Military Security
It is assumed that the proposed DGPS system would not operate in a
severely hostile environment, and so would not require immunity to jamming,
imitative deception, or electromagnetic pulse effects. In fact, the FRP specifies
that DGPS services could be suspended by the National Command Authority
during dire emergency, presumably to deny accurate targeting to hostile forces
[Ref. 9: pp. 1-23, 2-33].
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It is also assumed that the Department of Defense (DOD) will not object
to DGPS accuracy being made available to the general public on a routine basis.
DOD has published its intent not to constrain the use of SPS-based DGPS service
"... as long as applicable U.S. statutes and international agreements are adhered
to." [Ref. 9:p. 4-2]
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IV. REQUIREMENTS AND ALTERNATIVES
The mission objectives and assumptions from Chapter III provide the
foundation for determining the requirements for a DGPS service. These
requirements are discussed in Section A, below. In Section B, some alternative
conceptual DGPS implementations are outlined, but not discussed in depth.
Sections C and D give detailed discussions on the two selected alternatives: marine
radiobeacons and dedicated AMSC satellite channels.
A. REQUIREMENTS
The assumptions stated in Chapter III are bounding criteria; while they are
not repeated here, satisfaction of their conditions is necessary for any alternative
to receive consideration. For example, pre-planned product improvement (PT) is
assumed to be built-in, as is compliance with the RTCM SC-104 recommended
standard. In effect, they are fixed requirements.
Other requirements for a Coast Guard DGPS come from taking the aggregate
of the most demanding specifications of the mission objectives described in Chapter
III. Of these, the Harbor and Harbor Approach (HHA) navigation mission
requirements meet or exceed the requirements of the others. The FRP lists the
requirements for safe navigation of large ships in the HHA phase as follows [Ref.
9:p. 2-23]:
• Predictable Accuracy: 8-20 meters (2drms)
• Coverage: U.S. harbors and harbor approaches
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• Availability: 99.7%
• Fix Interval: six to ten seconds
• Fix Dimension: two
• Capacity: unlimited
• Ambiguity: resolvable with 99.9% confidence
GPS with any type of broadcast DGPS corrections inherently meets the last
three requirements, so they are not discussed here. However, the first four items
listed merit further discussion. There are also other requirements not specified by
the FRP that are brought to light in the Coast Guard Tentative Operational
Requirement (TOR). A total of eight criteria are given particular attention in the
following paragraphs: accuracy, coverage, availability, fix interval, integrity,
schedule, cost, and logistic support.
1. Accuracy
This requirement refers to the predictable accuracy (with respect to the
geographic coordinates of the Earth). The predictable accuracy required at a given
location within the coverage area depends upon the application, but the TOR has
set a tentative requirement of 10 meters (2drms), referenced to WGS-84 [Ref. 31:p.
21. While the FRP recognizes that better accuracy (one to five meter, 2drms) would
be desirable for resource exploration, the TOR does not require it [Ref. 9:p. 2-231.
2. Coverage
Coverage of a DGPS system depends both on the range of the signal
carrying the correction information, and on the validity of the information after
some time delay, at a given distance from the reference station (see Figure 2-3:
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"Coverage Cube"). The TOR has tentatively set coverage requirements for DGPS
as the area 20 km seaward from each critical waterway of the United States [Ref.
31:p. 31. This is taken as the required minimum; both of the alternatives extend
well beyond this.
3. Availability
The availability of the host GPS system (i.e., GPS without differential
corrections) approaches 100% for two dimensional surface marine applications.
One less pseudorange is required to fix the position of the user at a known altitude
(such as sea level) than for a situation where all three dimensions are unknown
[Ref. 9:p. A-32]. Redundancy is inherent in the GPS satellite configuration.
The DGPS system 99.7% availability requirement will dictate the use of
very reliable, mostly redundant DGPS system components. Redundancy may be
designed into system components with different "depths". Consider the data
integrity monitor function: if data from the differential reference receiver are
checked at two independent locations, this is a "depth two" functional component.
[Ref. 46:p. 288]
Let us consider the advantages of redundant components with a
simplified example. Failure at any single point in a depth one DGPS network
would cause system failure. We assume a four component system: differential
reference station, broadcast integrity monitor, broadcast node, and network
communications (including control station, if any). If each component has equal
availability, then each must have an availability greater than 99.92% in order to









= p (System avail)
However, if each functional component has an identical, redundant backup (depth
two), each of these redundant subsystems needs only 97.3% availability; this is
considerably less than the 99.9% figure for components in the configuration
without redundancy.
il-[p(Primary fail) * piBackup fail)])* = p {System avail)
We are using availability to include both the technical capabilities of
the radionavigation system and the physical characteristics of the environment
[Ref. 9:p. A-2]. The availability values just computed assume there are no
environmental events that prevent delivery of the transmitted signal to the user.
Actually, the effects of any such occurrences must be included in availability
forecasts. For example, the primary environmental threat to the host GPS
system's availability is a severe ionospheric disturbance, which can cause loss of
receiver lock. Such problems may arise in the near-equatorial regions, or in the
aftermath of solar events; they are generally observed by all receivers in a locality
[Ref. 47:p. 51].
4. Fix Interval
As defined by the FRP, the fix interval is the time between the
determination of independent position fixes from the system. A fix interval of six
seconds is specified by the FRP; however, this does not mean that a new
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pseudorange correction must be received by the user equipment every six seconds.
In DGPS operation, "old" corrections may be repeatedly and beneficially applied to
"new" GPS fixes at a rate determined by the user's navigation receiver. At the 50
bps data broadcast rate under the RTCM recommended standard, a DGPS message
received 20 seconds previously should still give results within the 10 meter (2drms)
accuracy requirement, even with selective availability errors in the GPS signals
[Ref. 7:p. 4-34].
5. Integrity
Some degree of integrity certainly is required in any public DGPS
radionavigation service, although it is not quantified in the FRP with the other
HHA phase safe navigation requirements. The TOR specifies:
An automatic, independent system should be employed to continuously
monitor reference station operation to detect system abnormalities and
failures. Automatic shutdown of the DGPS broadcast should occur in those
instances. [Ref. 31:p. 2]
This does not give us a quantitative minimum time-to-alarm. Looking
to existing radionavigation systems: Loran-C casualty procedures specify that when
out-of-tolerance conditions occur, the control station watchstander should wait no
longer than 60 seconds to "blink" the signal. This alerts users that system
information may be erroneous [Ref. 48:p. 2-58]. We will assume this 60 second
limit to be the requirement for the DGPS system time-to-alarm.
In the restricted waters of the HHA environment a 60 second time-to-
alarm might be dangerous. A highly desirable goal (but not a requirement) would
be to meet the aviation non-precision approach standard: a warning of an unusable
satellite pseudorange should arrive within 10 seconds [Ref. 16:p. 27].
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6. Schedule
DGPS should be operating in moat U.S. coastal areas by 1 January
1996 [Ref. 31:p. 2].
7. Cost
System acquisition and implementation should not exceed $20 million;
this value includes personnel, further development, and other implementation costs
(listed in Chapter 5.A.6.b). [Ref. 31:p. 3]
8. Logistic Support
The following requirements are set by the TOR:
Mean time between failure (MTBF) must be at least 90 days, with a failure
rate of less than 1% in 90 days. Mean down time should be no greater than
two hours, and the system should be self-diagnostic with built-in test
equipment. [Ref. 31:p. 4]
It is desirable to make use of existing Coast Guard resources, such as
Loran-C stations. However, staffing levels at existing stations are inadequate to
support additional workload, and more personnel may be required to perform new
DGPS tasks. [Ref. 31:p. 4]
B. STATEMENT OF ALTERNATIVES
This thesis illustrates the proposed methodology by analyzing a radiobeacon
broadcast and a dedicated satellite channel broadcast; these two were selected for
different reasons. The Coast Guard Research and Development Center has focused
its DGPS research on a radiobeacon-based system; thus, this alternative has been
selected as the "baseline" against which any other alternative should be compared.
Communications satellite transmission of DGPS signals was selected since it was
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deemed to be an alternative in need of further research. It has generally been
considered to be "too costly", and therefore unfeasible [Ref. 49J. However, the
satellite communications industry and its related technology is changing rapidly;
some forecasters anticipate a drastic decline in next-generation user equipment
costs (these are discussed and used in Chapter V.C.I).
In making engineering decisions, it is desirable to list all possible candidates
to guard against inadvertent omissions. Only after this listing should candidates
be disqualified for being obviously unworthy of detailed analysis [Ref. l:p. 40]. The
following paragraphs list some of the known broadcast node candidates besides
marine radiobeacon and dedicated AMSC satellite channel. This listing does not
consider each in detail. Although most of these other alternatives clearly do not
meet one or more of the previously discussed requirements or assumptions, some
could be credible competitors. A more thorough exploration and documentation of
all reasonably feasible alternatives should be performed as part of an operational
selection of a DGPS implementation.
1. Alternatives in Lieu of DGPS
It is conceivable that DGPS might prove not to be the optimal means of
satisfying the given requirements. For example:
• Generally available GPS accuracy and integrity could be improved by a
change in defense policy and control technology, or hybrid GPS receiver
integration with systems (see Chapter III.A.2.C and Chapter II.B.6.b).
• The Navy has been implementing Racal Decca HYPERFIX radionavigation
chains to support mine-countermeasure tasks in some ports. However, the
program has had calibration and availability difficulties, and has a dubious
future [Ref. 50].
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• John E. Chance & Associates markets a satellite-based positioning service
totally independent of GPS with three to five meter (2drms) accuracy.
However, it has a limited coverage capability [Ref. 51, Ref. 3:p. 5].
There currently exist many other commercially available radiolocation services that
could conceivably be adapted to provide the coverage, integrity and reliability
required for general navigation. These solutions are likely to be costly, however
[Ref. 7: p. 1-7].
2. SercePs MF (Groundwave) Broadcast System
Sercel, Inc. is based in France. This system uses frequency diversity to
broadcast DGPS information reliably despite atmospheric noise and fading. It
broadcasts one carrier in the upper MF band and one carrier in the lower HF band.
The transmission has an approximate range of 700 km over water and 100 km over
land. Spectrum availability is an issue in considering this system. [Ref. 52:p. 600]
3. High Frequency Skywave System
This system would rely on the ionosphere to refract radio waves back to
earth to transmit DGPS information to users up to 1000 km from the broadcast
node. Coverage over land would be good, in the absence of man-made noise.
Frequency diversity and overlapping coverage areas (to cover "skip zones") would
probably be required. Ionospheric variability and spectrum availability are major
concerns for this broadcast method. [Ref. 52:pp. 601-605, Ref. 53:Table 1]
4. VHF Line of Sight
The Coast Guard has a coastal VHF network in place, although it would
need to be significantly upgraded to be capable of continuous DGPS transmissions.
Digital communications to the marine public by VHF/FM for reasons other than
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DGPS may be forthcoming in the future; see the discussion of a consolidated
maritime data communications interface in Chapter III.B.3. DGPS service could
be added to such a digital communications channel with off-the-shelf, competitively
priced equipment. Limited range (10-60 nm) and spectrum availability are major
concerns with this solution. [Ref. 52:pp. 601-602, Ref. 53:Table 1].
5. Cellular Radio
This commercially available mobile communications service is becoming
increasingly available in U.S. coastal areas. However, such service is extremely
expensive to the continuous user. It also has limited range. [Ref. 52:p. 602, Ref.
53:Table 1]
6. TV Vertical Blanking Interval (PBS Datacast)
This broadcast method is discussed briefly by Lanigan, et al.; it is
currently used to provide color control to certain televisions, and closed captions for
the hearing impaired. However, there are significant holes in the coverage areas,
and broadcasts are not usually made 24 hours per day. [Ref. 52:p.602]
7. UHF Pseudolites
As discussed in Chapter II, a "Pseudolite" looks to the user like an extra
satellite, and eliminates the need for a separate data link for the broadcast of
corrections. The GPS receiver acquires the DGPS corrections directly. The RTCM
has proposed a design which appears to solve the problem of pseudolite
interference with nearby GPS users. The major problem with this solution appears
to be its short range. [Ref. 7:p. 1-1, Ref. 53:Table 1]
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8. "Other" Satellite Channel DGPS Service
It would be possible to communicate DGPS corrections by a satellite
communication channel other than the American Mobile Satellite Corporation's
(AMSC). Various companies currently are providing positioning (radiolocation)
service using leased capacity on existing communications satellites. There are
three communications satellite companies currently involved in the U.S. market:
Comsat, Geostar, and Qualcom.
a. Inmarsat and its U.S. Signatory, Comsat
Inmarsat was formed under the auspices of the Inter-governmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO), and is now based in London. It is a
nonprofit (yet commercially operated), multinational organization originally
chartered to provide the space segment necessary to facilitate communications in
support of safety of life at sea, maritime efficiency, marine public correspondence,
and radiodetermination [Ref. 54:pp. 593-595]. It has since expanded its functions
to include aeronautical and land-mobile satellite service.
Comsat is the "for-profit" U.S. signatory of Inmarsat. It makes
contributions to the capital requirements of Inmarsat in proportion to its 25%
investment share, and also shares in its income. Comsat provides access to U.S.
customers using the Inmarsat system. However, it is not permitted to compete
with Geostar, AMSC and Qualcom in the U.S. land-mobile market. Comsat is
permitted to provide aeronautical service to international flights arriving in the
U.S. [Ref. 55:pp. 19-22].
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Existing Inmarsat DGPS services require users to receive the
continuous signals through large and expensive Inmarsat Standard-A antennas.
The Inmarsat Standard-C channel suffers the disadvantage of an approximately 8-
second delay caused by data interleaving. Plans are underway to evaluate
provision of a higher power channel for DGPS, permitting use of smaller,
omnidirectional user antennas (such as those used for Standard-C service) without
such an interleaving delay. [Ref. 56 :p. 4]
b. Geostar
This is a U.S. company formed to provide Radiodetermination
Satellite Service (RDSS). Its positioning capability has been limited to
communicating information derived by Loran, or another external system.
However, Geostar was chartered to provide its own radiolocation services and a
limited two-way data message capability. It used spread spectrum transmissions
in the L-Band to communicate with mobile users. Geostar has recently gone
bankrupt and ceased operations. [Ref. 57:pp. 23-33]
c. Qualcom
This company provides "OmniTRACS" positioning and two-way
mobile data communications services using two leased Ku-Band (SHF) satellite
transponders. Depending on the configuration, positioning is either accomplished
by the mobile user's Loran-C receiver, or by satellite ranging. It does not currently
use DGPS. [Ref. 57:p. 33]
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d. Government Operated Space Segment
It may eventually prove most cost-effective to put a communications
transponder on a U.S. government operated satellite for the relay of DGPS signals.
Again, the prospect of evolving to a consolidated maritime data communications
interface is important to the future of DGPS, as discussed in Chapter III.B.3.
9. Pulse Position Modulation (PPM) of Loran-C Signals
This technique allows information transmission at a low data rate;
DGPS data could conceivably be transmitted on this channel. Past successful
communications trials have minimized impact on navigational performance of the
Loran system by modulating only two of every eight pulses, and by maintaining an
extremely low duty cycle [Ref. 58:p. 2861. It has not been shown that the system
could tolerate the 50 bps minimum data rate of DGPS without degrading Loran-C
performance.
C. MARINE RADIOBEACON MSK
The Coast Guard now operates marine radiobeacons that can be used for
DGPS service. Minimum Shift Keying (MSK) can be used to transmit data without
disturbing basic Radio Direction Finding (RDF) users. Since radiobeacon LF-MF
signals propagate well as ground waves, they bend with the curvature of the earth
and provide coverage well over the horizon without the need to rely on skywaves.
In fact, the over-water coverage of longer-range radiobeacons seems to fairly well
match the range over which a single DGPS reference station correction is valid
[Ref. 52:p. 600].
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Re-use of existing radiobeacon service spectrum is a major advantage of this
alternative over most others. The regulation of radio frequency spectrum can be a
tremendous barrier to a new system's implementation. Most new types of
communications systems must obtain frequency allocations through a long and
competitive review process before they can become operational.
1. Marine Radiobeacon Background
Radiobeacons are now used primarily for RDF, as discussed in Chapter
II.A.4.C. Aeronautical radiobeacons and calibration radiobeacons are not addressed
here. Federal policy on marine radiobeacons states:
There are approximately 200 USCG-operated marine radiobeacons.
Operation of this system will be continued indefinitely. The system is being
modernized and expanded slightly with some reconfiguring to better serve the
recreational boater who is the main user of the system.... Elimination of some
long range beacons and some changes in frequency assignments will result in
more efficient use of the allotted RF spectrum and allow for additional
beacons in some areas if needed. [Ref. 9:p A-19]
Radiobeacons can be short, intermediate or long range, and can be
sequenced or not. Sequenced beacons use time sequencing to operate in groups on
the same frequency without mutual interference; they are being phased out in
favor of continuous beacons.
• Short range radiobeacons are typically rated for a ten nautical mile (nm)
range. They are usually located in harbors or waterways, and are equipped
with 62.5 watt transmitters. Antenna height is typically 35 feet.
• Intermediate range radiobeacons are nominally rated for a 50 nm range.
They make up the majority of the marine radiobeacon system. They provide
for harbor approach, coastal, and Great Lakes navigation, and are equipped
with 250 watt transmitters.
• Longer range radiobeacons provide coverage over 100 nm. They are located
at widely separated sites of strategic importance to navigation, such as at
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significant landfalls. They are equipped with 1000 watt transmitters.
Antenna height is up to 125 feet.
Marine radiobeacons operate in the 285 to 325 kHz (LF-MF) band. The
transmitted signal consists of two separate carrier frequencies: a continuous carrier
at the assigned operating frequency and a keyed carrier 1.02 kHz higher which
provides the Morse code identification characters for that beacon [Ref. 48:p. 1-1].
The continuous carrier tone is necessary for automatic RDF receivers to minimize
jitter and hunting effects.
The following components are standard:
The equipment on a radiobeacon station consists of a coder, transmitter, an
antenna coupler and an antenna. Other equipment used for monitoring
station operation include an alarm-monitor unit, a reflected-power meter, and
a receiver. In addition, sequenced stations have electronic timers... [Ref.
48:p. 1-2]
The alarm-monitor is actually a radiobeacon receiver which sets off an alarm if a
discrepancy is detected. The reflected-power meter indicates the health of the
transmission line, antenna coupler, and antenna.
The radiobeacon site is monitored remotely by automatic or manual
means. If a radiobeacon is not fitted for automatic monitoring, it is checked at
least every eight hours by a Coast Guard radio communication receiver.
Automated monitoring capabilities are not uniform, but should alert a
watchstander if the following irregularities exist [Ref. 48:p. 1-3]:
• Incorrect timing of sequenced beacons
• Modulation that exceeds allowable range
• Low signal strength
• Improper code characteristic
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The most recent Aid Control and Monitor System (ACMS) implementations may
use phone and radio links to gather information from remote transmission sites for
handling by a manned watchstation. These communication links permit the
reporting of alarms from remote sites, or allow maintenance personnel to
interrogate remote equipment operating parameters.
For its traditional RDF use, radiobeacon service range is the range at
which it will provide a prescribed field intensity level to the user's antenna. These
intensities have been established by international agreement to account for the
variation of atmospheric noise with latitude, as follows [Ref. 48:p. 1-7]:
• 50 microvolts per meter for radiobeacons north of 40° N.
• 75 microvolts per meter for radiobeacons 40° N to 31° N.
• 100 microvolts per meter south of 31° N.
The system of radiobeacons is designed to avoid intrasystem
interference. The difference between desired and undesired signal strengths,
expressed as a ratio in decibels (dB) is known as the "protection ratio". It is set at
15 dB by Coast Guard policy. [Ref. 48:p. 1-7]
2. MSK Modulation
The present Coast Guard radiobeacon DGPS broadcast from Montauk
Point, New York uses a type of phase modulation called Minimum Shift Keying
(MSK). Existing hardware allows broadcast of RTCM SC-104 messages at a rate of
25, 50, 100, or 200 bps. The maximum data rate that could be modulated on one
radiobeacon transmission without disrupting RDF users or adjacent beacons has
not been determined. The phase modulation is performed on the 293 kHz center
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frequency of the radiobeacon signal, not on an adjacent "sub-carrier". Each bit is
represented by a 90° phase advance or delay of the carrier; advancing the phase
indicates a binary "1". [Ref. 21:p. 10]
MSK was chosen for this application due to its excellent spectral
efficiency. Other significant attributes of MSK, such as constant envelope, error
rate performance, and self-synchronizing capability are well explained by
Pasupathy in his 1977 IEEE paper [Ref. 59:p. 14]. Application of MSK to DGPS is
discussed by Enge [Ref. 60:pp. 6-7].
3. Existing DGPS Broadcast
The generic broadcast node's function is discussed in Chapter II.C.2.C.
The prototype DGPS broadcast facility at the Montauk Point high power
radiobeacon fills this role.
A two-card radiobeacon MSK modulator circuit board set plugs into an
ACMS-standard computer bus. This ACMS compatibility provides for remote
control of the modulation of the radiobeacon broadcast from the differential
reference station site [Ref. 21.p. 10].
The radiobeacon spectrum is heavily impacted by atmospheric noise,
especially lightning. Multiple discharges tend to appear as a series of 20 or 30
"spikes" about 50 milliseconds apart. Therefore, the radiobeacon data channel may
be characterized as a "burst" error channel, as opposed to a random error channel.
Such conditions indicate that a convolutional code and interleaving scheme could
be effective to combat atmospheric noise errors [Ref. 61:pp. 54-56]. Although such
error detection and correction (beyond that defined in the RTCM recommended
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standard) could be used to improve effective range, it would degrade timeliness,
and has not been used in the Montauk Point tests [Ref. 21:p. 10]. The
experimental broadcast monitor 20 nm away successfully received about 99.6% of
radiobeacon messages broadcast during the normal working hours of the last six
months of 1990 [Ref. 21:pp. 4-5].
The actual service range of the MSK radiobeacon broadcast remains to
be determined, with and without additional error control schemes. Field trials
have shown the system to provide good reception in excess of 300 nm; however,
further research must be done to comprehensively address this question [Ref. 21 :p.
11]. For the purposes of this study, we assume a 200 nm operational range can be
achieved. This is well beyond the 20 km coverage set as the tentative requirement.
Coverage is discussed further and illustrated in Chapter V.B.3.C.
The actual availability of basic radiobeacon service is not known
precisely. The FRP now only requires 99% availability, and radiobeacons perform
well in excess of this. Further investigation is needed to determine whether DGPS
radiobeacons would require enhanced maintenance schedules or other changes to
allow the entire DGPS system to meet the 99.7% availability required. Many sites
are in remote locations; data link and power supply reliability may be problematic.
4. User Segment
Sercel, Inc. has announced DGPS user equipment that contains an
internal radiobeacon MSK receiver. Magnavox has delivered a DGPS to Finland
and Sweden, and supplies MSK user equipment; the design is based on
radiobeacon MSK broadcasts fully compatible with the experimental USCG
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broadcasts from the Montauk Point radiobeacon. Other manufacturers are now
working on prototype systems. This is discussed further in Chapter V. [Ref. 30]
D. Dedicated AMSC Satellite Channel
The Coast Guard could contract to have the American Mobile Satellite
Corporation (AMSC) broadcast DGPS data on a dedicated channel. In Chapter V
this alternative is compared with the radiobeacon-based alternative just discussed.
The first AMSC satellite is scheduled for launch in 1994. Although not yet in
service, this alternative appears to be a contender for effective DGPS service in the
future. However, effectiveness and cost are both "risky", as discussed in Chapters
V and VI. No AMSC communications satellites have been launched. User
equipment prices and leased channel fees are forecast without the benefit of
current market prices to extrapolate from. Thus, the satellite alternative has a
greater risk than the radiobeacon alternative at this time. [Ref. 62]
1. AMSC Background
AMSC was formed as a consortium of several companies to provide
Mobile Satellite Service (MSS) to air, land, and marine mobile users in the UHF L-
Band in North America. In 1989 it was authorized to provide voice, data, and
facsimile services up to 200 nm offshore. It is required to provide coverage of the
continental U.S., Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. [Ref. 57:pp.
321, 439-461]
In order to encourage commercial applications of space technology,
NASA has agreed to "barter" launch services valued at $56.5 million in exchange
for experimental use of communications satellite capacity. Selected state and
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federal agencies may be allocated use of about 15% of one satellite's capacity over
two years. In the cost projections of Chapter V, satellite channel capacity for 1994
and 1995 is assumed to be free. [Ref. 62]
All AMSC services may be fully interconnected with the public
telephone network. An important feature of satellite design is the incorporation of
geographical "spot coverage". This allows frequencies to be reused, so long as
adjacent spot beams avoid spectrum interference. This is especially appropriate for
DGPS broadcasts that are generally not usable beyond a given distance from the
differential reference station. Power expended to provide coverage over an area
greater than a "spot" is wasted power. [Ref. 52 :p. 604]
2. Space Segment
AMSC was licensed in 1989 to launch and operate three spacecraft
using 1.5-1.6 GHz (UHF: L-Band) for mobile communications, and 11-14 GHz
(SHF: Ku-Band) for feeder-links. AMSC has agreed to cooperate with Canadian
Telesat Mobile Inc. (TMI), so that each provides fully compatible redundant
satellite capacity for the other in the event of space segment failure. [Ref. 62:p. 2]
3. User Segment
AMSC is working on the development of three basic user antenna
configurations, the smallest and least costly of which is omnidirectional (3"
diameter, 1" high). Unfortunately, the lower gain available with this user antenna
would require a more expensive, higher power satellite spot beam (EIRP = 25dB at
2400 bps) [Ref. 52:p. 604], AMSC intends to promote standards-based,
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non-proprietary user terminal designs [Ref. 62:p. 3]. This should encourage price
competition and innovation among many terminal manufacturers.
4. Ground Segment
A conceptual DGPS/AMSC data communication architecture is shown in
Figure 4-1. This segment is composed of one operational Network Control System
(satellite control and network management) and many fixed "feederlink" stations.
These feederlink stations are fixed gateway or base stations that connect to public
networks or private facilities, respectively [Ref. 57: p.448-451]. For a DGPS
service, these would be the interfaces to Coast Guard DGPS facilities; the Coast
Guard would provide a multiplexed data stream carrying information from many
differential reference stations to each. Gateways and base stations are distributed
throughout AMSC's coverage area to reduce long-distance landline costs.
This architecture implies the multiplexing of information from many
reference stations and integrity monitors at a few centralized Coast Guard DGPS
control facilities. Such a system may be particularly suited to growth towards a
"wide area" or "extended" DGPS service, using a few networked differential
reference stations to broadcast a multi-station solution to users [Ref. 63].
It is equally important that redundancy be designed into the terrestrial
components as in the space segment. As with the space segment, the TMI
Network Control System will provide this redundancy for satellite telemetry and
network management functions; the implementation must provide for rapid
changeover in the case of failure. Ground segment design and control mechanisms
also should provide for DGPS connectivity to alternate feederlink stations. These
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Figure 4-1 . Conceptual DGPS/Satellite Communications
Architecture
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backup stations should be located in different locales, so that a natural disaster or
blackout would be very unlikely to occur simultaneously at a feederlink and its
alternate.
5. Services and Marketing
AMSC intends to rely heavily on "authorized service providers" to





The primary emphasis of this thesis is to show how the DGPS project's
decision making and planning may be aided by comparing technological
alternatives using Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (CEA). This method is essentially a
means of quantifying "effectiveness per dollar of cost" for various alternatives; the
value of this ratio will be highest for the superior alternative. This section
describes the general theory behind application of the CEA problem-solving
approach to DGPS service design. Most details specific to DGPS follow in
subsequent sections, including technical criteria and estimated system costs.
1. Motivation for Performing CEA
The project's non-major system categorization (less than $20 million
investment cost) allows choosing of the best tools to implement a project of this
size. Although a CEA is not required, it is a tool that can give a return well worth
its moderate difficulty in this case. Applying CEA techniques to the proposed
USCG DGPS navigation system would help decision makers quantify the trade-offs
and would permit:
• The various parties to a decision to observe the basis for each other's
conclusion.
• The decision maker to draw on the intuitions and judgements of his/her staff
without abdicating decision making prerogative.
• Sensitivity analyses to be made of variations in the estimates. [Ref. 64]
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The CEA procedure to be described incorporates consideration of risk
and life cycle cost. This structure is especially suited to refinement and adaptation
in support of decision making in an environment of technological and policy
change.
2. Overview of CEA Steps
The essential steps of cost-effectiveness analysis adapted for DGPS
implementation planning are:
• define system objectives (Chapter III)
• state evaluation assumptions (Chapter III)
• identify essential mission requirements (Chapter IV)
• list alternatives (Chapter IV)
• establish effectiveness measures (Chapter V)
• evaluate alternatives' overall effectiveness (Chapter V)
• develop cost data (Chapter V)
• assess effectiveness and cost risks (Chapter VI)
• perform cost-effectiveness computations (Chapter VI)
• perform sensitivity analysis (Chapter VI) [Refs. 65, 66, 67]
3. Objectives, Assumptions and Requirements for DGPS
These first three steps are arguably the most important steps. They
have been performed in the previous two chapters, drawing primarily upon results
published in the Coast Guard's DGPS Tentative Operational Requirement (TOR)
[Ref. 31] and Federal Radionavigation Plan (FRP) [Ref. 9].
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4. Statement of Alternatives and Refinement
Alternatives were identified in Chapter IV, but not comprehensively. In
this study, the alternatives to be compared have been configured so as to allow the
use of available Coast Guard DGPS planning costs. Therefore, we have generally
adhered to the structure of the DGPS visualized in tentative plans. The following
description of the alternative refinement process is given to illustrate how a
comprehensive DGPS analysis should be performed.
The first step of this stage should be to note all reasonably feasible
alternatives. Before carrying out further analysis, a cursory review should be
performed to eliminate those that are:
• technically infeasible
• operationally infeasible due to overriding considerations delineated in the
assumptions/requirements statement
• economically unacceptable (over budget) [Ref. 65 :p. 51
At this point, variations of individual alternatives may be narrowed
down. The optimal variant of a general type of alternative may be identified, so a
full CEA of each variation is unnecessary. For example, for each alternative, the
DGPS analyst should determine:
• the best network configuration in terms of control:reference station:broadcast
node ratios.
• the optimal differential reference station spacing and system coverage.
• the optimal transmission rate.
The data rate of the channel may limit the effective differential
reference station:broadcast node ratio. Manpower analysis and the availability of
existing robust communications links will be important to control station assignment.
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The data update rate should not be firmly fixed in the earlier
requirements section unless mandated by international standards. Update rate is
a key parameter in determining accuracy, and can be an important tradeoff in this
optimization [Ref. 68:p. 211].
The optimal coverage for each general DGPS scheme could be estimated
by a very "rough-cut" and judgmental marginal-cost equated to marginal-utility
approximation. To support such evaluations, the FRP provides maritime
requirements/benefits guidelines [Ref. 9:pp. 2-1 - 2-36]. In accordance with
economic theory, curves of dollars/unit-coverage vs. coverage-area could be plotted
to find the optimal design. The FRP states:
The process to determine requirements involves: ... Evaluation of the
economic needs in terms of service needed to provide cost-effective benefits to
commerce and the public at large. This involves a detailed study of the
desired service by user group measured against the benefits obtained.
[Ref.9:p. 2-2]
It is impossible, however, to execute this process rigorously; the
marginal-utility is too hard to fix in terms of dollars. Commercial efficiency
produces obvious utility, but it is not easy to quantify; measuring improvement of
safety to human life and the environment is harder yet [Ref. 9:p. 1-22]. Marginal-
utility is also exceptionally difficult to forecast due to the unprecedented accuracy
of DGPS. As discussed in previous chapters, even system-educated potential users
cannot estimate their own demand until they've had an opportunity to make use of
dramatically new capabilities. Another complication is that user demand will
increase dramatically as complementary technologies such as ECDIS (Electronic
Chart Display Systems) are developed. Blanchard sums up these problems in his
discussion of the use of CEA as a tool for engineering design:
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Cost-effectiveness relates to the measure of a system in terms of mission
fulfillment (system effectiveness)... True cost-effectiveness is impossible to
measure since there are many factors that influence the operation and
support of a system that cannot realistically be quantified....thus, it is
common to employ specific cost-effectiveness figures of merit (FOM)... to allow
comparison of alternatives on the basis of the relative merits of each. [Ref.
l:pp. 136-137]
5. Effectiveness Measures
In the CEA process, a model of the total system effectiveness of an
alternative is necessary to consider all system design trade-offs. This is done using
a hierarchical weighting scheme: several "elemental" Measures Of Performance
(MOP's) are weighted and summed to produce one Figure Of Merit (FOM). All of
the system FOM's are weighted and summed to produce the overall system
effectiveness.
i









a. Identification of MOP's
Radionavigation-oriented measures are best suited to quantifying
the desirable traits of a DGPS service. Even though the transmission of DGPS
signals is technically more a communication system than it is a traditional
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radionavigation system, signal-oriented communications parameters [Ref. 66] do
not quantify the essential effectiveness traits as well as radionavigation-oriented
measures do.
System costs are not generally considered in MOP's; they are
included in the life-cycle cost calculations. There are rare exceptions, however.
For example, we use the "Technical Flexibility" MOP to consider the possibility
that user equipment might have to be replaced (at a large dollar cost) in the event
of a future change of broadcast mediums. In this case, the expected value of the
cost is more readily accounted for in the "effectiveness dimension" than as a cost.
b. Identification ofFOAfs
As used here, a Figure of Merit (FOM) is a summation of various
weighted MOP's. A single MOP could contribute to more than one FOM. The
MOP's and FOM's for the DGPS analysis are proposed in Section B of this chapter.
The relative weights (contributions) of MOP's to each FOM, and FOM's to overall
effectiveness should be assigned before any rating is done. This helps to avoid the
inadvertent inclusion of personal bias in the model.
c. Calculation of Overall Effectiveness
The effectiveness modeling procedure now calls for assigning
utilities, and calculating the FOM expected values. The calculation of expanded
overall effectiveness for each alternative will involve differently weighting each
FOM before taking the sum of them.
If "risk" (i.e., the size of the probability distribution about the
expected value, or the degree of uncertainty) is estimated for each FOM rating.
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statistical techniques for combining these factors must be applied in order to
produce the proper aggregate risk. However, it also would be reasonable (and
much simpler) to estimate the effectiveness risk for each alternative directly,
without going through the procedure of estimating risks at the FOM level and
combining them later. This is the approach used in this thesis; effectiveness risk is
estimated as part of analysis.
6. Develop Cost Data
a. Cost Analysis Methods
There are three types of cost analysis techniques prescribed for
Coast Guard systems acquisition use: Analogy, Parametric Model, and Engineering
(Work Breakdown Structure). For major systems, the first two methods are
typically used in the early developmental stages. By the production phase, detailed
engineering estimates should be made by extrapolating from known values [Ref.
69:p. 5-16].
The Coast Guard operated (service provider) portion of the system
would apply existing technology and commercially available equipment with
forecastable costs. Therefore, the engineering WBS technique has been used by
Coast Guard planners for the DGPS project, even though it is in its conceptual
stage. This breakdown is not presented here, but its resultant totals have been
incorporated in the cost spreadsheets for both alternatives. [Ref. 70]
On the other hand, future costs and quantities of user equipment
require application of the analogy technique, as will be seen in the following
section. Since the government would provide the DGPS system in the interest of
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the public good, Federal policy mandates that analysis consider user equipment as
part of system cost [Ref. 9:p. 1-26]. We may determine the current price of off-the-
shelf equipment, component parts or services whenever possible, and extrapolate
for future costs. The price of DGPS user equipment is falling rapidly, and can be
expected to continue to follow a "progress" curve decline. Analogy with mature
navigation systems is useful in determining the type and rate of decline (see
Section C.I.).
b. Life-Cycle Costs
Investment costs are relatively small compared to the aggregate of
life-cycle research and development, production and investment, operation and
support, and salvage and disposal costs. It is reasonable to assume that salvage
value will approximately offset disposal costs, and this last phase of the life-cycle
may be ignored. The following is a detailed listing of cost elements by phase; the
R&D, investment, and operations elements are generally incorporated in the Coast
Guard planning costs used in the Appendix A DGPS estimates. [Ref. 71 :p. 267]
R&D INVESTMENT OPERATIONS SALVAGE /D ISP
Planning Production Personnel Inventory
Management Planning/Mgt Consumables Closeout
Engineering Init Spares Support Shipping
Test Training Facilities Data Mgt
Evaluation Suprt Equip Maintenance Refurbishing
Equipment Tech Manuals Shipping Waste Mgt





Discounting techniques should be incorporated to account for the
future value of money at some point in the cost computations. OMB circular A-94
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prescribes a rate of 10%, applied using a discount factor equal to l/(l+r)1 [Ref. 72].
For this CEA, discounting is performed as the last calculation on each page of the
cost spreadsheets (see Appendix A).
7. Risk Assessment
The cost analysis procedure should make cost risk estimates. It is
preferable in this case to make a direct estimate of risk, as previously discussed for
the effectiveness dimension. In this study, this estimate is made in the analysis of
Chapter VI for each alternative.
8. Cost-Effectiveness Computations
A single table is created to summarize the results of previous
effectiveness and cost determinations. Since the comparison of alternative DGPS
systems considers alternatives with unequal cost and unequal effectiveness, the
table will provide a basis for the graphical analysis of the next step.
A planar cost-effectiveness graph may be used to compare alternatives,
as illustrated in Figure 5-1. The expected values of life-cycle costs, including public
user set expenses, are plotted on the X-axis. The expected values of effectiveness
are plotted on the Y-axis. Effectiveness and cost risks will eventually be drawn as
circles or ellipses around the plotted alternatives. The analyst may plot the
domain of feasibility defined by the cost ceiling and minimum effectiveness, if
desired (not shown here). Points outside the domain of feasibility are not viable
candidates. The slopes of the lines drawn from the origin to the alternatives show
us C-E ratios. Slope represents effectiveness per dollar of cost, and is shown in
Figure 5-1 by the angle in the lower left corner. This may also be done
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numerically. Large slopes and large numerical C-E ratios are generally preferable
when budget constraints are pressing.
B
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Figure 5-1. Comparison of Hypothetical Alternatives: Planar Cost-
Effectiveness Graph [after Ref. 67]
9. Sensitivity Analysis
Sensitivity analysis is performed in Chapter VI. The goal of this step is
to identify those areas in which relatively minor changes in parameters could
change the choice of an "optimal" alternative.
This includes estimating "risk": the size of the probability distribution
about the expected values of overall effectiveness and life-cycle cost for each
alternative. The statistical confidence interval (usually "2 sigma", or 95%) is
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plotted about the expected value on each axis of the Cost-Effectiveness (C-E) graph.
The realm of possibility defined by the ellipse around any alternative is a good
representation of its risk in each dimension. In this case, large risks will weigh
heavily against an alternative due to the need to field a DGPS system quickly.
There are other uncertain values to be considered in addition to cost
and effectiveness estimates. The following quantities also should be adjusted, and
the evaluation recomputed to investigate their significance: market price trend
(slope factor), number of user DGPS sets, MOP and FOM weights. [Ref. 65:p. 19]
10. Conclusions on the CEA Process
The result of the analysis process should not be considered a definitive
"answer" as to which implementation alternative to adopt. Subjective evaluations
are implicit in the methodology, and the result can only be as objective and
accurate as the analyst. Rather, the CEA process should be considered a tool to
aid the decision maker in grasping the appropriate information.
B. EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
This section develops measures and compares the strengths and weaknesses
of the two DGPS alternatives selected in Chapter rV. It is beyond the scope of this
study to comprehensively address the many other technically feasible alternatives
in this study. However, by selecting and developing the following effectiveness
measures it is possible to create a structure that can be useful for evaluating
various configurations of a nationwide marine DGPS system with minimal
modification.
97
There are ten standard radionavigation system parameters prescribed in the
FRP. Some of these are well suited to this CEA; for example, accuracy,
availability, and integrity (defined in Chapter II), come from that list. Others have
been modified, such as signal characteristics. Some have not been included
because they are essential requirements, and would be automatic disqualifiers if
not met (such as "ambiguity"). Addressing important criteria has dictated the use
of five primary Figures of Merit (FOM's), as defined by the following five
subparagraphs. Each is made up of several Measures of Performance (MOP's).
In practice, definition of MOP's and FOM's precedes the assignment of
weights, which precedes the assignment of utilities for each alternative. This
sequence discourages the inclusion of preconceived bias in the model. However, in
the interests of clarity, we will define each MOP and immediately illustrate it in
terms of the DGPS alternatives being evaluated; see Tables 5-1 and 5-2 for the
numerical values assigned.
1. Accuracy
As was noted in Chapter II.C.l, the important design considerations for
accuracy of a DGPS system are the baseline distance between the reference station
and the user, and the age of a correction when it is applied to the measured
pseudorange by the user. The age of the oldest corrections will be the sum of the
update interval and the transmission latency.
a. Update Rate
The DGPS Type 1 Message correction for each satellite pseudorangp
will be broadcast at intervals that depend on several factors. The estimations
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Tables 5-1 and 5-2. MOP Ratings and FOM Expected Values








Update Rate 4 5 6
Latency 4 5 4
RefSta Spacing 2 5 5








Dependability 10 5 s
Resist. EMI 3 5 5
Resist lono Var 2 5 3
Resist MP & Obs 5 5 4
Graceful Degr. 5 5 3








HHA/Coastal 10 5 5
Ocean Phase 5 5 5
Inland Waterway 5 5 9








Timeliness 4 5 4
Index of Safety 6 s s








International 3 5 3
Interagency 3 5 7
Technical Flex. 6 5 7
Open Sys Int 3 5 s
Spectral Eff. 6 5 5
Institutional 6 5 3
jADAPTABILITYWT TOTAL 5 5













ACCURACY WTsd 5 5 5
AVAILABILITY WTs 10 5 4.24
COVERAGE WTed 5 5 6
INTEGRITY WTed 10 5 4.6"
ADAPTABILITY WTd 10 5 5
Overall Wt Eff s 4.S35
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made in Chapter II. C. 3. assumed the minimum data rate of the broadcast medium
allowed by the RTCM recommended standard. However, a higher data rate is
permissible and would avoid the need to use the oldest corrections.
b. Latency
How old will a "new" correction be when it can be applied to the
user's navigation solution? We will use this measure of effectiveness to refer to the
time lag between the moment the GPS signal arrives at the reference station until
the moment the broadcast correction is available to be applied to the user's
measured GPS pseudorange. A representative estimate of these delays for a
satellite-based integrity monitoring system is [Ref. 16:p. 43]:
• Processing of GPS signal: 0.2 - 1.2 sec
• Processing of data and formatting: 0.3 sec
• Reference to broadcast station propagation: 0.1 - 0.3 sec
• Broadcast station processing time: 0.2 sec
• Broadcast station data processing and formatting: 1.2 -4.4 sec
• Broadcast station to user propagation time: 0.3 sec
• Receiver demodulation and data processing: 0.4 sec
Differences in the latency seen using each alternative arise in the
transmission from reference station to broadcast station to the user; processing
time within the reference station and at the user site is assumed the same. The
radiobeacon alternative would experience a negligible broadcast propagation time,
and perhaps a slightly shorter reference to broadcast station propagation time; let
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us say a total 0.4 second advantage. Otherwise the two alternatives would be
equal.
We will assume uncoded broadcasts for both alternatives; that is,
there are no additional interleaving or parity algorithms incorporated on top of the
RTCM recommended parity algorithm. This assumption would not hold if forward
error correction were to be used to correct detection errors of radiobeacon
transmissions at long distances, at the cost of increased transmission time.
c. Reference Station Spacing
How far is the user from the reference station? Reference station
spacing is the only design criterion that affects spatial decorrelation. Also, this
distance may degrade the DOP if a satellite visible to the user is not visible to the
reference station, and can not be used in the DGPS solution. In the cases we are
considering, the number and spacing of the reference stations are the same.
2. Availability
a. Component Dependability
This MOP measures a system's resistance to component failure
causing interruption of service. Although reliable individual components are
important, redundancy is critical to achieving high availability. Ideally, there
should be no "single point of failure"; each part should have a backup.
The two alternatives under consideration will be identical except for
the data link from the reference station to the broadcast station, and the broadcast
station itself. Unfortunately, the designs of both systems are currently in such a
formative stage that any advantage between the two cannot be determined. For a
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radiobeacon DGPS system with 44 broadcast nodes there should be enough
overlapping coverage to permit users with mature MSK receivers to quickly switch
from a catastrophically failing beacon to an adjacent healthy one. Similarly, AMSC
intends to have redundant satellite capacity through a cooperative agreement with
Canadian Telesat Mobile Inc.
b. Resistance to EMI
How much will the presence of nearby power lines or lightning
storms degrade signal reception? Manmade and natural interference will cause
noise that will restrict the coverage and/or availability of both systems. The
precise degree to which each will be affected is unknown at this time.
c. Resistance to Ionospheric Variations
This general phenomenon was discussed in Chapter IV.A.3.
Satellite transmissions will be affected by severe ionospheric events. It is expected
that radiobeacon communications will be much less degraded, if at all. Although
the propagation time of the radiobeacon LF-MF signal may be changed, such
events should not block reception by users in the coverage area. Therefore, it is
anticipated that the radiobeacon alternative will have an advantage over satellites
in this MOP.
d. Resistance to Multipath and Signal Obstruction
How well will signals be received in the vicinity of bridges and
other obstructing or reflecting metal structures? Radiobeacon transmissions are in
the LF and MF bands, and so bend around obstructions better than do line-of-sight
satellite UHF transmissions. However, the satellite is overhead, and so is likely to
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encounter fewer obstacles (e.g., mountains) in proceeding to a user than would the
ground wave of the radiobeacon. In the maritime HHA environment envisioned, it
is anticipated that the radiobeacon alternative will have an advantage over
satellites in this MOP.
e. Graceful Degradation
As was discussed under component dependability above, redundant
systems must provide for service reacquisition in event of momentary loss. For
DGPS, non-adjacent momentary losses aren't too bad, so long as the resultant
increase in the age of the correction being applied doesn't become excessive. The
time required to switch to any alternate broadcast source is important to this
MOP. Also, the spatial decorrelation associated with the user acquiring its
corrections from this new source should be considered.
In the case of radiobeacons, the switch to the alternate source
should be rapid, requiring only a decision and reacquisition by the user receiver.
For the satellite alternative, a complex transfer of data link paths must take place
that surely would require much more time. However, switching to an alternate
radiobeacon would imply the loss of the corrections from the closest reference
station, even if it were working perfectly. The redundant satellite transmission
would be capable of broadcasting all the reference stations, as before. Overall, the
radiobeacon is deemed to have an advantage in this MOP, since time delay is
generally more damaging than spatial decorrelation.
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3. Coverage
See Figures 5-2 and 5-3 for the projected coverage areas for the two
alternatives. Coverage of a DGPS system depends both on the range of the signal
carrying the correction information, and upon the validity of the information at a
given distance from the reference station. Coverage is limited by the ability to
receive the broadcast signal over long distances in the presence of noise. Accuracy
and coverage are related in that coverage ceases to be assumed when distance from
the reference station causes accuracy to exceed the required limits (spatial
decorrelation). It is also limited by the probability of poor geometry arising when
satellites available to the user are not visible at the reference station.
It would appear that significant portions of both Mexican and Canadian
coastal and inland territory would be coincidentally covered by the lease of AMSC
spot beams for DGPS transmissions. The potential for cost-sharing exists, but is
not considered here.
a. HHA and Coastal Phases
The actual coverage and number of spot beams to be implemented
by AMSC is subject to final system definition and regulatory approval. However,
satellite spot beam coverage of all required areas is assumed feasible by using six
spot beams as specified in 1990. In addition, we will assume that Hawaii will be
served by a side lobe of the Alaskan beam. Given these assumptions, both











Figure 5-3. Projected Coverage Area: Satellite
Alternative [Ref . 62, taken from promotional literature]
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6. Ocean Phase
In general, the coverage of the satellite spot beams is dependent on
regulatory considerations: they are limited to within 200 nm of the coast. The
coverage of the radiobeacon DGPS broadcast is heavily dependent upon the data
rate and coding used by the specific system used. We will assume 200 nm offshore
coverage for this option as well, in the absence of forward error correction [Ref.
21:p. 6].
c. Inland Phase
The alignment of AMSC spot beams shown in Figure 5-3 may not
be final. However, it appears likely that most inland areas will be covered by the
satellite spot beams required for HHA phase coverage. This inland coverage area
would be much larger than that resulting from implementation of DGPS using
maritime radiobeacons, whose signal propagates less efficiently over land than over
sea. The radiobeacon coverage illustrated in Figure 5-2 assumes 200 nm coverage
over seawater, and 55% of this (llOnm) over land [Ref. 61:p. 56]. This favors the
satellite alternative.
4. Integrity
Integrity mechanisms must be provided to verify that the GPS
pseudoranges are within usable tolerances and that the DGPS broadcast itself is
transmitting correct information.
o. Timeliness
This MOP quantifies the negative impact of requiring additional
time before warning a user of an unusable pseudorange. For example, if a
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particular broadcast medium were particularly subject to error, the integrity
monitor might be designed to not "alarm" until several consecutive unacceptable
corrections were broadcast, thus multiplying the warning time. This is apparently
not the case for either of the alternatives under consideration here.
The rationale for predicting the time to receive a warning of failure
will be essentially the same as that for estimating the average age of a DGPS
correction, as discussed above under "accuracy" [Ref. 16:p. 43]. Thus, about a 0.4
second advantage is expected for the radiobeacon alternative, which is barely
significant here. A warning of an unusable satellite pseudorange should arrive
within 10 seconds of its exceeding safe parameters to comply with the rigorous
aviation non-precision approaches in the U.S. [Ref. 16:p. 27].
b. Index of Safety
This MOP takes into consideration the danger of the integrity
mechanism failing altogether, and transmitting dangerously erroneous information.
This MOP also considers protection against excessive false alarms. If an integrity
monitor station fails, it is preferable that a coordinating station be available to
assume the task of determining the point of failure and discarding the faulty input
than to have the DGPS signals be declared unusable until the integrity mechanism
may be repaired. This feature reduces the danger of the user community ignoring
a proper alarm due to excessive previous false alarms. These considerations are
dependent on the design of the reference station and integrity monitoring
components, and are assumed to be identical for the alternatives considered here.
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5. Adaptability
This FOM is an umbrella for several difficult-to-quantify objectives and
considerations that were discussed in Chapter III. All look beyond the technical
issues of the basic problem toward engineering a solution well-suited to adapting to
future events.
a. International Compatibility
This consideration was discussed in Chapter III. B. 2. a. Adherence
to the RTCM "Recommended Standards for Differential NAVSTAR GPS Service'' is
assumed for any acceptable alternative, but the RTCM does not endorse any
specific data broadcast method. However, some alternatives will tend to lead more
directly to standardized, internationally compatible DGPS user equipment than
others.
At the present time, radiobeacons seem to have the edge in this
category. The RTCM document singles out MSK modulated MF radiobeacons as
an attractive candidate. The IALA Radionavigation Technical Committee, Systems
Working Group has reported "that maritime radiobeacons are the most suitable
means of transmitting corrections in a coastal area" [Ref. 53:p. 61. Also:
Foreign efforts are now underway for other prototype DGPS services. The
Swedish board of Shipping and the Finnish Board of Navigation are engaged
in a joint effort to provide a marine radiobeacon-based DGPS service for the
ferry systems which operate between Stockholm and Helsinki. The service
will begin this Spring and the results will premiere at the September 1991
meeting of the IALA in Stockholm, Sweden. [Ref. 21:p. 6J
b. Interagency Compatibility
This objective was discussed in Chapter III.A.3.f. Corps of
Engineers, FAA, DOD, and NOAA needs and initiatives may be better
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complemented by a particular alternative. For example, the broadcast of
decimeter-level DGPS information desired by the Corps of Engineers may be
feasible on a satellite channel, but not on the radiobeacon MSK channel due to its
limited data rate [Ref. 52:p. 2]. It would also be less difficult for a satellite-
oriented Coast Guard DGPS network to provide integrity information for a satellite-
based GIC, which FAA seems intent on implementing. Therefore, the satellite
alternative seems to have an advantage.
c. Technical Flexibility
Modularity and considerations for future expansion should be
designed into any DGPS system fielded, as discussed in Chapter III.B.l. Examples
include provisions for multi-station DGPS solutions and expansion to other
broadcast media, such as a public maritime data communications interface.
For both alternatives, the network can be designed quite well with
these considerations in mind. However, the satellite alternative seems to be
superior in this MOP due to its greater potential data rate. Also, if it is decided to
shift to another medium altogether, the radiobeacon alternative would leave many
users with obsolete DGPS user equipment sets; satellite equipment sets, on the
other hand, would probably be partially usable for other satellite communication
applications.
d. Open Systems Interoperability
This MOP does not refer to the broadcast of DGPS corrections in
terms of the OSI reference model, but to the design and operation of the DGPS
network itself. The considerations associated with this were discussed in Chapter
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III.B.2.b. The DGPS network should consist of multi-vendor interoperable modules
with standard interfaces. The system can be designed to satisfy these
considerations equally well with either alternative.
e. Spectral Efficiency
This MOP has two aspects. As was noted in Chapter III.B.3, there
are difficult and time consuming barriers to acquiring new spectrum allocations for
data transmissions. Also, some implementations of DGPS service could interfere
with existing services.
Neither of the alternatives we are analyzing would have a need to
acquire additional spectrum utilization authorization. Fears that the MSK
modulation scheme would interfere with certain aviation radiobeacon direction-
finding equipment designs have not been confirmed [Ref. 21:p. 11]. Thus, both
alternatives are considered equal with respect to this MOP.
f Institutional Impact
One aspect of this MOP was discussed in Chapter III.A.3.g.: support
of other radionavigation services. The synergy with the GPS civil liaison mission
will be gained equally well with either DGPS implementation.
Mariners have become less likely to use radiobeacons for direction-
finding in recent years, and significant savings could be had by eventually
discontinuing their operation. The radiobeacon alternative has a negative impact
upon the Coast Guard radionavigation program in that it may prohibit the phasing
out of radiobeacons in the future. On the other hand, it is possible that this use of
radiobeacons would pave the way for utilizing them for other data transmissions.
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As discussed in Chapter II. C. 4, the RTCM standard has already reserved certain
message types for exploration of multi-purpose data links.
Another aspect of this MOP relates to private sector participation in
radionavigation services, as discussed in Chapter III.B.6. Companies desiring to
provide radionavigation services to the public generally wish to do so with Coast
Guard licensing and monitoring, so as to gain the some protection against liability
in the event of a catastrophic failure. This places the government in a vulnerable
position over which it would prefer to maintain full control. Additionally, such a
government sponsored (but commercially provided) public service could be abruptly
discontinued due to private sector financial difficulties beyond the government's
control. Finally, it is probable that merchant vessel regulations will mandate the
carrying of DGPS equipment; it would be undesirable to require the carrying of
equipment designed to access a single company's service.
Assignment of utility to this MOP is very subjective; each
alternative has a disadvantage in a different aspect. However, the satellite
alternative is perceived to have the stronger overall disadvantage in this MOP.
6. FOM Calculations
After defining these measures, the CEA procedure calls for establishing
MOP weights, assigning utilities, and calculating the FOM expected values [Ref.
65:pp. 9-10]. A weight and utility (zero to ten) have been assigned to each
alternative relative to each MOP in Table 5-1. For each MOP, the radiobeacon
alternative (the median alternative in this case) has been assigned a utility of five
The FOM expected values are computed in Table 5-1 and carried forward to Table
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5-2, where they are weighted and totaled to determine the effectiveness totals.
Risk for each alternative is considered in Chapter VI.
C. DGPS COST ESTIMATION
Appendix A contains the computations for total present value life-cycle cost
(including the public's user equipment) for each of the alternatives under
consideration. The present value cost of the satellite alternative ($190.3 million) is
estimated to be much higher than that of the radiobeacon alternative ($109.1
million). The cost disparity is primarily due to the impact of more expensive
satellite user terminals.
The primary origin of the acquisition and operation cost figures is the March
1991 "Resource Prospectus" for the proposed DGPS. In accord with that source
document:
• Four percent inflation is applied to project 1992 "Budget Year" dollar
requirements. Subsequent years all assume 1992 dollars. Thus, "BY+1"
indicates 1993 costs in 1992 dollars.
• Personnel costs are assumed to be $50,000 per individual. This is an average
cost, which incorporates pay, benefits, and attributable institutional
overhead.
1. User Equipment
The anticipated 25 year life-cycle requires some difficult forecasts of
user equipment cost and public demand. These estimates allow us to consider the
relatively modest signal equipment acquisition costs against the perspective of
much larger life-cycle costs.
Analogy with the previous radionavigation systems was the primary
source for user equipment projections.
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The development and implementation of Loran-C, Omega, and more recently,
GPS follow along similar paths... a competitive market supported by
numerous, mostly small companies materializes, and the quantity of receivers
sold increases with a corresponding drop in price.... [Ref. 73:p. 43]
It has been assumed that these patterns may also be extended to DGPS. The
graphs illustrating Loran-C's history given by Beukers [Ref. 73:p. 43] provide a
guide for the trends to be assumed for DGPS user equipment in the cost
spreadsheets (Appendix A). Figures 5-4 and 5-5 are adapted from this source.
However, Appendix A assumes that user equipment prices level out at $100 per
set.
Other sources support recognition of these trends, as well. The 1983
"NAVSTAR GPS Simulation and Analysis Program" report prepared by the
Transportation Systems Center draws on existing cost studies to project costs of
GPS receivers 18 years into the future.
To a first approximation, each trend can be characterized by a period of time
whereby the subcomponent price is cut in half, called the "cost-halving" time.
[Ref. 74:p. 9-4]
The report also notes that receivers will use more digital and fewer analog
components over time, and cites a 3.5 to 5.0 year cost-halving period for digitally
oriented civil navigation components [Ref. 74:p. 9-4, E-6]. The Loran case history
is within the lower end of this span. Appendix A therefore is considered
reasonably conservative in its use of a 4.0 year cost-halving period for DGPS
receivers of both types; this coincides fairly well with Beukers' Loran graph over
the relevant range.
Determining a starting point from which to apply this model required
the author to make some subjective evaluations. It was found that forecasts of
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prices for each type of DGPS reception equipment varied widely among experts in
the field. This aspect of the CEA model should certainly be re-evaluated as market
prices mature.
a. DGPS/Radiobeacon Receiver Price
In April 1991 Magnavox quoted a price of $6,800 for a MX-50R
Radiobeacon MSK receiver. This price was deemed to be too early to serve as the
origin of the cost-halving trend just described. Referring to the Loran-C analogy,
one should note that there was a significant drop in user set price in 1975. This
took place after Loran-C was declared the official radionavigation system for U.S.
coastal waters. A similar drop is probable for Radiobeacon MSK DGPS equipment
prices should that alternative be officially adopted.
Instead of extrapolating directly from this known price, four
knowledgeable industry observers were interviewed and provided 1996 price
forecasts. Each expert's "best guess" was between $2000 and $400. The author
has selected $1000 to proceed with the analysis. This price estimate includes
manufacturer and distributor overhead, in addition to cost of parts. It is used to
define the starting point for plotting price trend as a straight line on "log-lin"
graph paper. Cost and demand projections actually used are illustrated
graphically in Figures 5-4 and 5-5. [Ref. 73:pp. 42-47]
b. DGPS/AMSC Satellite User Terminal Price
AMSC representatives stated that user equipment is still under
development. However, they anticipate a market price of $2000 for land-mobile
voice terminals when produced in volume [Ref. 62]. Other knowledgeable industry
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observers estimated that this type of DGPS receiver will have a parts-count four to
ten times that of the $1000 (estimated) radiobeacon MSK receiver. The author
estimates a price of $2500 for a marine unit adapted for the DGPS data link
function in 1996.
2. Operation Cost
No forecasts of fees for continuous DGPS broadcasts were available
from AMSC as of this writing; the satellite broadcast fees cited here [Ref. 52:p.
604] could not be confirmed. This adds considerable risk to the satellite
alternative cost projections in Chapter VI.
Previous cost analyses show that electronics labor costs will tend to
rise, offsetting declining digital component costs [Ref. 74:p. 9-4]. Continuing
maintenance and operating costs are deemed to be more labor oriented, so cost-
halving trends applied to user costs have not been applied to the operating costs in
Appendix A.
3. Present Value Cost
When costs are distributed over time, economic theory dictates that the
time value of money be considered. A monetary cost in the future is multiplied by
a discount factor to yield its present value, as discussed in Section A of this
chapter. Present value cost over time for each alternative is illustrated in Figure
5-6. The relative sizes of service acquisition (i.e., Coast Guard implementation
costs), service operation, and user equipment total present value costs for each
alternative are listed in Table 5-3 and illustrated in Figure 5-7.
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Table 5-3. Cost Breakdown Categories: Life-Cycle Cost ($M)
Radiobeacon Satellite
User Equipment ($M) 58.8 134.6
Service Operation ($M) 40.0 47.9
Acquisition ($M) 10.3 7.8
Total PV Cost ($M) 109.1 190.3
4. Component Cost Estimations
Several cost estimations in Appendix A were made with the best
information available to the author as of this writing, but are very likely to become
firmer in the near future. These include:
• User equipment costs and demands.
• Earth station interface cost. It has been assumed that the Coast Guard
would not purchase earth stations in the interest of future flexibility.
• System architecture. It has been assumed that the cost of establishing and
maintaining redundant connectivity from necessary Coast Guard operated
components to the AMSC earth station would be equal to that of connectivity
between the 44 radiobeacons and other system components. It has also been
assumed that integrity monitor costs are equivalent.
• Satellite channel capacity broadcast cost. The broadcast fees cited here are
in the process of being re-evaluated by AMSC as of this writing [Ref. 52:p.
604].
• Satellite facility regulation. Governmental oversight cost is the author's
estimate.
• New radiobeacon installation and operating costs. This will vary significantly
according to final system configuration and the remoteness of the sites.
• USCG operating personnel costs. These estimations pessimistically assume a
low degree of control station automation and no cross-utilization of existing
Coast Guard unit personnel. However, any resulting inaccuracies are applied
equally to both alternatives, since radiobeacons are unmanned facilities.
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Figure 5-6 . Present Value Total Cost over Time
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"Risk" is used here to mean the size of the probability distribution about an
expected value. The uncertainties (risks) associated with the effectiveness and life-
cycle cost estimates for each alternative are different, depending on the author's
confidence in the forecasts used to make the estimates. Once these risks are
assessed, they are displayed by plotting the statistical confidence interval ("2
sigma", or 95% is used here) about the expected value on each axis of the Cost-
Effectiveness (C-E) graph. The realm of possibility defined by the ellipse around
any alternative is a good representation of its risk in each dimension. In this case,
large risks will weigh heavily against an alternative due to the need to field a
DGPS system quickly.
1. Effectiveness Risk
Basically, effectiveness risk is proportional to the maturity of the
technology associated with each MOP in Table 5-1. For example, research needs to
be done to ascertain each alternative's resistance to manmade electromagnetic
interference in the harbor environment (see Chapter V.B.2.b). Effectiveness risk
also incorporates the possibility that an alternative may eventually fail to be
feasible at all; this might be considered "overall" risk, which is difficult to assign to
any one MOP or FOM, but may be considered in aggregate here.
The author has assigned the radiobeacon alternative an effectiveness
risk of ± 0.4 (95% confidence interval). The radiobeacon alternative has a proven
122
Coast Guard prototype, as well as an operational system in Scandinavia. It is
almost certain that a system meeting the minimum requirements of Chapter IV
can be implemented before 1996. However, the integrity safeguards necessary to
meet the requirements specified in Chapter IV have not yet been demonstrated.
There is also some question on how the remote location of many of the radiobeacon
sites will impact availability. Data links and power supplies may be unreliable at
difficult sites.
The author has assessed the satellite alternative's effectiveness risk to
be ± 1.2 (95% confidence interval); this is approximately three times as great as
that of the radiobeacon alternative. Although other satellite companies have
successfully proven the viability of mobile-user satellite communications systems,
no AMSC communications satellites will be launched before 1994. Space programs
have a history of schedule difficulties, well illustrated by the delays in GPS
satellite launches due to the space shuttle accident. In dealing with any
commercial communications provider, delays or difficulties might also arise due to
spectrum allocation disputes, or to financial difficulties beyond the control of the
Coast Guard. AMSC's arrangement with the Canadian company TMI to provide
redundant capacity and AMSC's willingness to provide adequate ground station
redundancy are other effectiveness risk factors beyond the Coast Guard's control.
2. Cost Risk
This measure quantifies the probability that the cost of the DGPS
service will be greater or less than expected. Both alternatives share a similar
degree of cost risk for acquisition of common system components and operating
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personnel costs, as discussed in Chapter V.C.4. For example, USCG operating
personnel costs estimations pessimistically assume a fairly low degree of
automation and no cross-utilization of existing unit personnel; actual
implementation may allow for significant savings in this category.
The author has assigned the radiobeacon alternative a cost risk of
± 20% of the estimated present value life-cycle cost (95% confidence interval),
including factors common to both alternatives. This is approximately $21.8
million. The majority of this risk is due to DGPS/radiobeacon user equipment cost;
this is due to its relative size in comparison to total cost (see Figure 5-7) and to the
long range forecasts required for the life-cycle model (as discussed Chapter
V.C.I. a.). Satisfactory units are currently in production, but market prices are
changing rapidly. The DGPS/radiobeacon alternative's service acquisition and
operation cost estimates are deemed to be fairly good. However, new radiobeacon
installation and operating costs may increase significantly if the necessary
availability can not be obtained using existing remote radiobeacon sites.
The author has assessed the satellite alternative's cost risk to be ± 25%
of the estimated present value life-cycle cost (95% confidence interval); this is
approximately $47.6 million. Again, the majority of this risk is due to user
equipment. AMSC user equipment prices and leased channel fees are forecast
without the benefit of current market prices. In addition, it is not certain that the
Coast Guard can win the use of free channel capacity as described in Chapter
IV.D.l. The satellite broadcast fees cited in past literature could not be confirmed
or updated by AMSC. Satellite facility regulation and oversight burden costs are
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the author's estimates; in actuality, they would depend on the organizational
relationship developed during implementation.
B. COST-EFFECTIVENESS
Overall effectiveness and life-cycle costs were evaluated in Chapter V. Now
that risks have been estimated, we have all the information necessary to construct
the planar cost-effectiveness graph as described in Chapter V.A.8. Numerical
results are summarized in Table 6-1. The resulting ratio represents the
effectiveness per dollar of life-cycle cost. Since the effectiveness is measured in
artificially generated units that are very small compared to costs, the ratios for
both alternatives have been normalized by dividing by the radiobeacon
alternative's effectiveness-to-cost ratio.
Table 6-1. Numerical Cost-Effectiveness Summary
Radiobeacon Satellite
Overall Effectiveness 5.0 4.835
Effectiveness Risk ±0.4 ± 1.2
Life-Cycle Cost ($000) 109148 190290
Cost Risk ($000) ± 21830 ± 47572
Normalized Cost-Eff Ratio 1.0 0.55
In this case, it appears that the satellite alternative is drastically more
expensive, and slightly less effective than the radiobeacon alternative. Therefore,
the radiobeacon alternative is almost twice as cost-effective. The planar cost-
effectiveness graph of Figure 6-1 illustrates the differences. Effectiveness and cost
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risks have been joined to form ellipses around the plotted alternatives. The slopes
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Figure 5-1. Graphical Cost-Effectiveness Comparison of Radiobeacon
and Satellite Alternatives
C. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
The goal of this step is to identify those areas in which relatively minor
changes in parameters could change or bar the finding of an "optimal" alternative.
Several variations on the fundamental model discussed in the previous sections are
of interest. It was found that there are some variations that could bring the two
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alternatives closer together, but that no one reasonable variation would reverse the
finding. The following scenarios are discussed below:
• Assume equal user equipment costs
• Assume a shorter life-cycle
• Omit user equipment costs from consideration
• Assume a different user equipment cost trend and market demand curve
• Omit present value costing
• Assume different FOM weights in computing effectiveness
1. Equal User Equipment Costs
The cost difference between the two types of user equipment is a
decisive factor in the finding that the radiobeacon-based system is the more cost-
effective alternative. The analyst could not make a confident selection (based on
cost-effectiveness alone) were user equipment costs assumed to be equal.
During preliminary research for this thesis, initial user set costs were
estimated without the benefit of the expert technical opinions cited in Chapter
V.C.I. It was found that these preliminary forecasts of prices and demands for the
two types of DGPS reception equipment were so close that it was not reasonable to
differentiate between their expected values. For this variation, a 1991 $7,000
radiobeacon MSK receiver was used to define the starting point for plotting this
trend as a straight line on "log-lin" graph paper (e.g., 1996 price estimated at
$3000). AMSC representatives could not initially provide a current price estimate,
so estimated user equipment costs were extrapolated from the 1987/1988 AMSC
filings with the FCC [Ref. 57:p. 136]. This put the 1996 cost reasonably close to
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the radiobeacon MSK receiver's, although the satellite receiver would have a much
greater risk associated with its cost projections.
Table 6-2 indicates the overall results of equating user equipment cost
at $3000 in 1996 for both alternatives.
Table 6-2. Cost-Effectiveness Summary: Equal User Costs
Radiobeacon Satellite
Overall Effectiveness 5.0 4.835
Life-Cycle Cost ($000) 210222 215639
Normalized Cost-Eff Ratio 1.0 0.94
Cost risk would be considerably higher than in Table 6-1 for both
alternatives in this scenario. The cost-effectiveness distinction between the
alternatives would be insignificant in comparison to the "noise" induced by the
vagueness of the cost estimates. However, the radiobeacon alternative would still
retain a significant advantage of having a lower effectiveness risk.
2. Shorter Life-cycle
It is reasonable to speculate that whatever DGPS broadcast medium is
selected now, it could be made obsolete by new policy and technology before the
end of its projected 25 year life-cycle. Cost-effectiveness would be changed
somewhat in such an occurrence, but not enough to change the finding. Table 6-3
interrupts the cost model in the year 2000 (BY+8); Table 6-4 does the same in the
year 2005 (BY+13).
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Table 6-3. Cost-Effectiveness Summary: End Service Year 2000
Radiobeacon Satellite
Overall Effectiveness 5.0 4.835
Life-Cycle Cost ($000) 52059 81605
Normalized Cost-Eff Ratio 1.0 0.62
Table 6-4. Cost-Effectiveness Summary: End Service Year 2008
Radiobeacon Satellite
Overall Effectiveness 5.0 4.835
Life-Cycle Cost ($000) 78771 137738
Normalized Cost-Eff Ratio 1.0 0.55
3. Omit User Equipment Costs
The Federal Radionavigation Plan states that analysis should consider
user equipment as part of system cost [Ref. 9:p. 1-26]. However, the cost-
effectiveness values would be greatly affected by ignoring this mandate and
considering only the cost to the service provider, as shown in Table 6-5.
Table 6-5. Cost-Effectiveness Summary: Omit User Equipment
Radiobeacon Satellite
Overall Effectiveness 5.0 4.835
Life-Cycle Cost ($000) 50330 55748
Normalized Cost-Eff Ratio 1.0 0.87
The cost-effectiveness distinction between the alternatives would not be
as significant as in the foundation analysis. Risk estimates have not been
quantified for this sensitivity analysis: however, the risk associated with the cost
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and effectiveness estimates probably would cause the ellipses plotted on the cost-
effectiveness graph to overlap. Regardless, the radiobeacon alternative would
retain the significant advantage of having a lower effectiveness risk.
4. Different User Equipment Cost/Demand Curves
Changing the user equipment cost-halving rate or modifying the
demand curves illustrated in Figures 5-4 and 5-5 would change the relative costs of
user equipment in proportion to other expenses. As seen in the previous
paragraphs, increasing the proportional cost of user equipment will accentuate the
finding in favor of the radiobeacon alternative. Decreasing this proportion blurs
the distinction, but does not reverse the finding.
5. Omit Present Value Costing
OMB circular A-94 prescribes the discounting technique discussed in
Chapter V.A.6.C. [Ref. 72]. Omitting this procedure would make the costs incurred
in the operations and user equipment categories proportionally more expensive
than in the foundation scenario. However, this does not alter the choice of
alternative, as shown in Table 6-6.
Table 6-6. Cost-Effectiveness Summary: Omit P.V. Costing
Radiobeacon Satellite
Overall Effectiveness 5.0 4.835
Life-Cycle Cost ($000) 340404 589546
Normalized Cost-Eff Ratio 1.0 0.56
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6. Different FOM Weights
Table 5-2 used the FOM weights as perceived by the author to make its
overall effectiveness evaluation in favor of the radiobeacon alternative. "Coverage"
is the only FOM in which the satellite alternative enjoys an advantage. If this
criterion were to take on much greater weight, and availability and integrity were
de-emphasized, then the satellite alternative would receive a higher effectiveness
rating than the radiobeacon alternative. However, even by increasing this FOM to
ten and reducing all others to five, the overall effectiveness would be only 5.14,
compared to 5.0 for the radiobeacon alternative. See Table 6-7: this hypothetical
effectiveness advantage could not overcome the tremendous cost disadvantage
imposed by user equipment cost, as forecast by the foundation model. This
variation would merit re-evaluation in the event that the market price of
DGPS/AMSC satellite user equipment were to prove equal to the price of the
alternative, as discussed in paragraph 1.
Table 6-7. Cost-Effectiveness Summary: Vary FOM Weights
Radiobeacon Satellite
Overall Effectiveness 5.0 5.14
Life-Cycle Cost ($000) 109148 190290
Normalized Cost-Eff Ratio 1.0 0.59
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vn. CONCLUSIONS
In this study, the author consolidates the discussion of key Differential
Global Positioning System (DGPS) issues within one document, considers the cost-
effectiveness analysis process, identifies DGPS technical decision criteria, estimates
alternative system costs, and executes a comparison of two DGPS service
alternatives. The primary conclusions relate to the need for DGPS service, the
applicability of cost-effectiveness analysis, the identification of effectiveness
criteria, and the preliminary finding that a radiobeacon-based system is preferable
to one based on a dedicated satellite channel.
A. NEED FOR DGPS SERVICE
The Coast Guard DGPS service initiative is an innovative and worthwhile
program that addresses an emerging national need for extremely high navigational
accuracy. One of the Coast Guards's missions is to establish and operate electronic
aids to navigation to prevent disasters and serve the needs of the maritime
commerce of the U.S. DGPS has the potential to provide an unprecedented
capability for radionavigation in restricted waters, particularly if it is integrated
with real-time display on electronic charts. This combination could allow higher
vessel safety or economic efficiency in harbors, especially in darkness or unfamiliar
ports. DGPS-level accuracy is also needed for the Coast Guard's own use to
perform its missions most efficiently. The Coast Guard is well suited to provide
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DGPS service, since it can build on the experiences of its other radionavigation
systems.
B. COST-EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
Cost-effectiveness Analysis (CEA) is an economic analysis tool suitable for
performing systems engineering during the design of a DGPS service. This method
is essentially a means of quantifying effectiveness per dollar of cost. It allows
consideration of the elements of the system on an integrated basis. The
effectiveness model quantifies the various performance trade-offs to allow
optimization of system design. The cost analysis portion of the CEA provides a
structure for the inclusion of life-cycle costs, including user equipment (as required
by Federal policy).
The model, in itself, is not the decision maker, but a tool that presents the
necessary data in support of the decision-making process. It allows various parties
to a decision to observe the basis for each other's conclusion. Instead of supplying
an immediate answer, the CEA model may aid the evolution of a DGPS service
design by facilitating iterative systems engineering to gradually produce an
optimal solution. This CEA model is especially suited to decision making in an
environment of technological and policy change, since it can be easily refined and
updated over the predicted four-year implementation period.
The essential steps of cost-effectiveness analysis adapted for DGPS
implementation planning are:
• define system objectives (Chapter III)
• state evaluation assumptions (Chapter III)
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• identify essential mission requirements (Chapter IV)
• list alternatives (Chapter IV)
• establish effectiveness measures (Chapter V)
• evaluate alternatives' overall effectiveness (Chapter V)
• develop cost data (Chapter V)
• assess effectiveness and cost risks (Chapter VI)
• perform cost-effectiveness computations (Chapter VI)
• perform sensitivity analysis (Chapter VI)
C. DGPS DECISION/SELECTION CRITERIA
The structure for analyzing the effectiveness of a DGPS system is proposed in
Chapter V.B., and illustrated in Tables 5-1 and 5-2. This model is a simplified
representation of the real world, which is adapted to abstract the features of the
problem being analyzed. It is designed to compare the effectiveness of alternatives
satisfying the fundamental system requirements. This is done using a hierarchical
weighting scheme: several "elemental" Measures Of Performance (MOP's) are
weighted and summed to produce one Figure Of Merit (FOM). All of the system
FOM's are weighted and summed to produce the overall system effectiveness. The
relative weights (contributions) of MOP's to each FOM, and FOM's to overall
effectiveness should be assigned before any rating is done. This helps to avoid the
inadvertent inclusion of personal bias in the model.
The analysis of DGPS technology, objectives, assumptions and considerations,
and requirements lays the foundation for the selection of effectiveness criteria;
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these are called MOP's and FOM's in the model. MOP's are grouped by the FOM
they contribute to as follows:
• Accuracy: update rate, latency, reference station spacing
• Availability: component dependability, resistance to EMI, resistance to
ionospheric variations, resistance to multipath and signal obstruction,
graceful degradation
• Coverage: harbor and harbor approaches and coastal phase, ocean phase,
inland phase
• Integrity: timeliness, index of safety
• Adaptability: international compatibility, interagency compatibility, technical
flexibility, open systems interoperability, spectral efficiency, institutional
impact.
D. COMPARISON OF SELECTED ALTERNATIVES
The preliminary findings of this thesis indicate that a system using
radiobeacon broadcast nodes is preferable over satelhte-based system. In this case,
it appears that the satellite alternative is drastically more expensive, and slightly
less effective than the radiobeacon alternative. Therefore, the radiobeacon
alternative is almost twice as cost-effective. Also, the larger risks associated with
the satellite alternative weigh against it, due to the need to field a DGPS system
quickly. However, these CEA results are based upon the author's necessarily
subjective weighting and rating of the two systems' performance parameters and
preliminary cost information. Only these two system configurations were
considered.
The effectiveness and cost risk analysis indicate a high level of confidence in
this finding; the "realm of possibility" ellipses in Figure 6-1 do not overlap.
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Furthermore, sensitivity analysis shows this conclusion to be quite robust in the
face of other changes in the model. No areas have been found in which relatively
minor changes in parameters could reverse the finding of an "optimal" alternative.
It was found that there are some variations that could bring the two alternatives
close together, but no one reasonable variation would reverse the finding.
User equipment prices are the primary factor in the total life-cycle cost of
DGPS service alternatives considered here. About 53% of the DGPS/radiobeacon
alternative total cost was attributable to user radiobeacon receiver equipment.
About 71% of the DGPS/AMSC satellite alternative cost was attributable to user
satellite terminal equipment. It is important to foster innovation and price
competition among commercial manufacturers in order to minimize DGPS user
equipment prices. This will encourage widespread public use of a beneficial,
safety-oriented service.
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